Dr Maleeha Lodhi :
How will relations between Pakistan and India shape up after the Indian elections? Will the election outcome help to accelerate or slow down the normalisation of ties between them?
Most importantly for Islamabad, will the next government in Delhi agree to revive the broad-based composite dialogue that was suspended since early 2013? Or will it persist with an approach that limits the bandwidth of talks by cherrypicking issues in order to recast the terms of engagement?
Answers to these questions will obviously emerge after the elections. But Pakistan will have to carefully think about how to engage the new government and ensure productive dialogue that builds stable relations. For now, all outstanding disputes between the two countries are deadlocked while the contribution trade liberalisation can make to steadier relations remains untested.
Many Indian analysts argue that irrespective of who wins the election, the fundamentals of India’s policy towards Pakistan will not change. That may be true. But the complexion and stability of the next government will have a bearing on relations with Pakistan.
It is therefore useful to consider the possibilities that might emerge from the election. The least likely is a Congress win. With a tenure marred by corruption scandals and an economic slowdown, the Congress seems headed for a historic defeat. Even if the party makes a miraculous comeback and cobbles together a coalition it would be a weak government unable to take major initiatives including with Pakistan.
A start-stop pattern of diplomatic engagement would continue. There might be movement on trade but no progress on the contentious issues that have stalled past trade liberalisation efforts.
Opinion polls support the second possibility – the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) emerging as the largest party in a campaign dominated by its controversial prime ministerial candidate Narendra Modi, but falling short of a majority of 272 in the 543-member Lok Sabha. A BJP-led coalition could be built if the party secures around 175 seats. Modi’s premiership would be guaranteed if the BJP musters 200 seats or more, enabling it to forge alliances with regional or smaller parties on its terms.
Winning less than 150 sets will mean the BJP would have to concede more to regional allies many of whom would insist on a leader other than Modi to head the coalition.
What would a Modi-led government mean for relations with Pakistan? Many argue that having previously dealt with a BJP government, Pakistan might find it easier to manage relations with India under a strong right-wing government, not on the defensive at home on Pakistan policy and able to make diplomatic compromises. But there are too many unknowns about Modi to support this sanguine view.
Even if Modi’s domestic economic priorities persuade him to enhance economic ties with Pakistan, his reputation for muscular nationalism will urge him to take a harder line on contentious issues.
A third possibility indicated by the rising influence of regional parties and the formation of an 11-party Third Front is a non-BJP, Non-Congress coalition government similar to that led by H.D. Deve Gowda in 1996 and subsequently by I.K. Gujral. Although the front includes leaders like Nitish Kumar it is unlikely to win enough seats.
It could however hold the balance of power in a coalition supported by the Congress. Even so, it would be a fragile arrangement unlikely to last long. Under such a shaky government there can be little expectation of any breakthroughs in Pakistan-India relations.
Each of these possibilities will oblige Islamabad to evolve a differentiated and carefully calibrated diplomatic response. But a more fundamental challenge lies ahead. This is if the new government chooses an approach similar to that followed by Delhi in recent years – of selective engagement on issues of priority to India while ruling out renewal of the comprehensive eight-issue process, known as the composite dialogue.
Some might argue that partial normalisation is better than none, so why not press ahead with selective engagement? Trade, after all, benefits Pakistan too. There are several reasons why a fragmented dialogue will not achieve enduring normalisation. The most fundamental is sustainability. Past experience testifies that moves to open up trade are often set back due to non-trade factors – incidents on the Line of Control in Kashmir are the latest example of this.
To be sustainable, building economic ties also requires addressing issues of discord between the two countries. The renewal of a full-fledged comprehensive peace process remains the most viable means to manage differences and build on areas of convergence to achieve lasting détente.
(Dr Maleeha Lodhi is a former Pakistani ambassador to the US and the UK)
