Talmiz Ahmad :
Syria has been in the throes of civil conflict for nearly five years. In this period, a quarter of a million people have lost their lives and over four million have been rendered homeless, with several thousand of them now streaming as refugees into Europe. Almost all the major cities have been destroyed, and historical monuments, representing the country’s rich and eclectic culture have been systematically levelled to the ground.
The Syrian conflict is mainly being conducted by militia with different identities and loyalties, with different sponsors in the region who provide them with weaponry, training and logistical support as part of a region-wide proxy war between the giants – Saudi Arabia and Iran, centred on continuing or removing the Assad regime. Daesh is the unaffiliated third party whose vision is to consolidate its “Caliphate” across the Levant: to this end, it attacks Shia targets across the region, confronts Sunni militia in Syria, and competes robustly with Al Qaeda for control of all jihadi groups in the region.
The entry of Russian military forces into Syria has brought a new player into this battleground. The Russians’ old Soviet-era naval base at Tartous on the Mediterranean is being expanded and upgraded. It has just been augmented by an army and air base near Latakia, the heart of Assad’s Alawi support-base. This new base occupies a part of the Basel Assad international airport and has a camp to house air and military personnel. This base will be the hub of massive Russian military supplies to Syria, including air and ground attack aircraft, combat and transport helicopters and battle tanks. There are already reports that Russian air and ground forces have been deployed in armed action, even as they have seriously enhanced the firepower of the Assad regime.
The Russian entry into Syria seems to have caused consternation in the US. Most US commentators have in recent months been criticising the American role in West Asia as being directionless and marked by “confusion and indecision”, while Arab writers almost universally have described the US as an “unreliable ally”, with little credibility in the region. The view in the US administration now seems to be that the Russian role in Syria is to be welcomed since it is directed at the common enemy, Daesh. The US and Russian defence ministers have met recently to coordinate armed action against Daesh, signalling a more accommodative American approach in Syria and, more importantly, to Russia itself after the freeze due to Ukraine. This interaction suggests that Assad’s continuation as president over the short-term could be acceptable to the US.
Most observers tend to agree that Russia has real concerns relating to the proliferation of Daesh and other jihadi groups in West Asia, fearing their influence on its own Muslim-majority in the north Caucasus region. At least 2000 Russian speaking jihadis are already said to be in Syria. Again, Russia is not just opposed to externally-sponsored regime change; it also believes that those wanting Assad to go have no clarity about the political scenario on the day after. Russia itself is convinced that Assad’s ouster will see continued civil conflict and the possible ascendancy of extremist groups in Syria. Some commentators have also suggested that the Russians might wish to consolidate control over the populated coastal area of Syria, with Latakia at its centre, in case the Assad regime has to retreat to its heartland in the face of escalating attacks from rebel forces.
The Russian military entry in Syria has significant implications for the strategic scenario in West Asia. It has brought Russia and Iran on the same side both in regard to the preservation of the Assad presidency, the key to the Iranian outreach to the Mediterranean and its links with the Hezbollah, and in the battle against Daesh. Again, a larger Russian military role in Syria will suit Iran, which will now be able to use its resources more effectively in Iraq.
Egypt seems to be supportive of the Russian intervention. It has made it clear that it is opposed to regime change in Syria, wants the Syrian army and state institutions to remain in place and be strengthened, and prioritises the putting together of a “regional coalition against terrorism”. Egyptian commentators are particularly pleased by indications that Russia and Iran would support a lead role by Egypt in putting a political process in place in Syria.
Turkey is increasingly seen as an unreliable partner in the regime-change project: after recent elections, it is increasingly concerned about the re-emergence of the challenge to its national integrity from the increasingly popular Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the party’s nexus with the Syria-based Peoples’ Democratic Union (PYD) which controls large tracts of Kurdish territory along the Syria-Turkey border. President Erdogan’s principal effort now is to obtain US support for a “buffer zone” in an enclave at the border which would disrupt the contiguity of the Kurdish territories in Syria and Iraq.
The GCC countries led by Saudi Arabia continue to insist on the removal of President Assad as a precondition for the commencement of a political process in the country, seeing in the Assad regime the continued consolidation of Iran’s hegemonic and sectarian interests in the Middle East. While seeking a peaceful resolution, they are not averse to the military option, given the increasing effectiveness of the rebel militia against national forces. They view the Russian military intervention as an “escalation”, but take comfort in the expectation that the Russian foray perhaps heralds “the birth of a new Afghanistan on Syrian soil”.
(The author is the former Indian ambassador to the UAE)
