Laura Bosco :
(From previous issue)
DPKO launched a board of inquiry to investigate the events, but only publicly released a one-paged summary of its findings, consistently refused to name the under-performing units, and remained vague on the subsequent plans to send home poor performers. Impressive reporting by one advocacy group found that, months after the inquiry concluded, only one commander had been quietly repatriated.
Promised plans to hold full contingents appear to have been “overtaken by geopolitical concerns” and by obstruction “coming from New York.”
Absent greater transparency, the effort to identify and hold accountable poor performers is made significantly more difficult for advocacy groups.
This is to the detriment not only of an informed international conversation, but also to the secretary-general himself, who often finds himself between a rock and a hard place on performance accountability, in need of allies.
Inescapable dilemmas, limited leverage, and the need for partners
Another episode from South Sudan highlights the secretary-general’s frequent and unenviable position of facing inescapable dilemmas, limited leverage, and a need for partners. In July 2016, violence broke out in the capital city of Juba, resulting in the death of over 300 civilians and displacement of 42,000. UN peacekeepers again performed their protection mandate poorly, providing “inconsistent” defense of the thousands of civilians sheltered on their base and “almost nonexistent” protection to those beyond its gates. UN headquarters, however, subsequently took a significantly different approach to assessing responsibility and demonstrating accountability.
In November, the Secretariat released a lengthy summary of the appointed independent review, including within it the nationalities of poor performing contingents. “Alarmed by the serious shortcomings identified,” Ban Ki-moon asked for the immediate resignation of the mission’s Force Commander, Lieutenant General Ondieki of Kenya.
These measures were heralded by many, but certainly not all.
The Kenyan government was furious and declared its intention to immediately pull its 1,000 troops from the mission and to cancel its plans to contribute soldiers to the Regional Protection Force. Within a week, the first batch of 100 Kenyan soldiers was withdrawn.
Kenya’s retaliation highlights an inescapable dilemma for the secretary-general: Accountability requires independence, but the Secretariat is fundamentally in a position of dependence.
The UN depends upon voluntary troop contributions from member states to task its missions, and is thus sensitive to offending major troop contributing countries. Compounding this, perpetual troop shortages limit the organization’s options for being selective in force generation a priori and can undermine the credibility of threats to later hold poor performers accountable.
While similar tensions are at play in cases of peacekeeper misconduct, over 1,000 peacekeepers have been repatriated for SEA, including the symbolic dismissal of the special representative to the Central African Republic.
A late victory for Ban was the passage of Security Council Resolution 2272, which endorsed (and thus begins to institutionalize) the secretary-general’s power to repatriate whole contingents where there is credible evidence of patterns of misconduct.
Even so, many still caution against overusing such drastic measures, acknowledging that “countries aren’t exactly queuing to contribute troops to peacekeeping missions.”
In the case of South Sudan, recent reports warn that the country “stands on the brink of an all-out ethnic war” and even a “Rwanda-like” descent into violence, and call for the immediate deployment of peacekeeping reinforcements.
Impending atrocities paint the secretary-general’s position-weighing a principled stand against dire short-term realities-in a stark light.
In the near-term, the secretary-general has an unlikely ally in the regional body, as the Inter-governmental Authority on Development continues to urge the Kenyan government to reverse its decision. Member states who have signed on to the Kigali Principles-committing to the protection of civilians-seem another natural partner and should be encouraged to condemn, as a norm, any such member state retaliation.
Finally, in the more distant future, ongoing member state initiatives to broaden the available pool of peacekeepers will hopefully help buttress the secretary-general’s ability to credibly threaten repatriation and resist reactive coercion.
The new secretary-general has the opportunity not only to continue Ban Ki-moon’s work to address blatant peacekeeper misconduct, but also to expand accountability measures to include assessing peacekeeper performance.
The task ahead will not be easy. It requires, first, the hard work of establishing clear performance standards and, second, a commitment to transparency in subsequent monitoring and reporting.
Both are required to facilitate-last but certainly not least-the constructive engagement of a wide variety of potential accountability partners, including journalists, advocacy groups, sympathetic member states, and invested regional bodies. On January 1, Guterres assumed “the most impossible job on this earth,” but in improving performance accountability, he cannot and need not work alone.
(From previous issue)
DPKO launched a board of inquiry to investigate the events, but only publicly released a one-paged summary of its findings, consistently refused to name the under-performing units, and remained vague on the subsequent plans to send home poor performers. Impressive reporting by one advocacy group found that, months after the inquiry concluded, only one commander had been quietly repatriated.
Promised plans to hold full contingents appear to have been “overtaken by geopolitical concerns” and by obstruction “coming from New York.”
Absent greater transparency, the effort to identify and hold accountable poor performers is made significantly more difficult for advocacy groups.
This is to the detriment not only of an informed international conversation, but also to the secretary-general himself, who often finds himself between a rock and a hard place on performance accountability, in need of allies.
Inescapable dilemmas, limited leverage, and the need for partners
Another episode from South Sudan highlights the secretary-general’s frequent and unenviable position of facing inescapable dilemmas, limited leverage, and a need for partners. In July 2016, violence broke out in the capital city of Juba, resulting in the death of over 300 civilians and displacement of 42,000. UN peacekeepers again performed their protection mandate poorly, providing “inconsistent” defense of the thousands of civilians sheltered on their base and “almost nonexistent” protection to those beyond its gates. UN headquarters, however, subsequently took a significantly different approach to assessing responsibility and demonstrating accountability.
In November, the Secretariat released a lengthy summary of the appointed independent review, including within it the nationalities of poor performing contingents. “Alarmed by the serious shortcomings identified,” Ban Ki-moon asked for the immediate resignation of the mission’s Force Commander, Lieutenant General Ondieki of Kenya.
These measures were heralded by many, but certainly not all.
The Kenyan government was furious and declared its intention to immediately pull its 1,000 troops from the mission and to cancel its plans to contribute soldiers to the Regional Protection Force. Within a week, the first batch of 100 Kenyan soldiers was withdrawn.
Kenya’s retaliation highlights an inescapable dilemma for the secretary-general: Accountability requires independence, but the Secretariat is fundamentally in a position of dependence.
The UN depends upon voluntary troop contributions from member states to task its missions, and is thus sensitive to offending major troop contributing countries. Compounding this, perpetual troop shortages limit the organization’s options for being selective in force generation a priori and can undermine the credibility of threats to later hold poor performers accountable.
While similar tensions are at play in cases of peacekeeper misconduct, over 1,000 peacekeepers have been repatriated for SEA, including the symbolic dismissal of the special representative to the Central African Republic.
A late victory for Ban was the passage of Security Council Resolution 2272, which endorsed (and thus begins to institutionalize) the secretary-general’s power to repatriate whole contingents where there is credible evidence of patterns of misconduct.
Even so, many still caution against overusing such drastic measures, acknowledging that “countries aren’t exactly queuing to contribute troops to peacekeeping missions.”
In the case of South Sudan, recent reports warn that the country “stands on the brink of an all-out ethnic war” and even a “Rwanda-like” descent into violence, and call for the immediate deployment of peacekeeping reinforcements.
Impending atrocities paint the secretary-general’s position-weighing a principled stand against dire short-term realities-in a stark light.
In the near-term, the secretary-general has an unlikely ally in the regional body, as the Inter-governmental Authority on Development continues to urge the Kenyan government to reverse its decision. Member states who have signed on to the Kigali Principles-committing to the protection of civilians-seem another natural partner and should be encouraged to condemn, as a norm, any such member state retaliation.
Finally, in the more distant future, ongoing member state initiatives to broaden the available pool of peacekeepers will hopefully help buttress the secretary-general’s ability to credibly threaten repatriation and resist reactive coercion.
The new secretary-general has the opportunity not only to continue Ban Ki-moon’s work to address blatant peacekeeper misconduct, but also to expand accountability measures to include assessing peacekeeper performance.
The task ahead will not be easy. It requires, first, the hard work of establishing clear performance standards and, second, a commitment to transparency in subsequent monitoring and reporting.
Both are required to facilitate-last but certainly not least-the constructive engagement of a wide variety of potential accountability partners, including journalists, advocacy groups, sympathetic member states, and invested regional bodies. On January 1, Guterres assumed “the most impossible job on this earth,” but in improving performance accountability, he cannot and need not work alone.
(Laura Bosco is a PhD Candidate in the School of International Service at American University).
