Denis M Till :
(From previous issue)
Another problem that arose with the FIB was political disagreement within the mission over the question of which armed groups to target in FIB military operations, following the successful neutralisation of the M23 (FDLR, ADF etc.).
In the case of the FIB in Congo, the question of whether (even) more robust peacekeeping also means more successful peacekeeping is likely to be answered in the negative: Not because the FIB energetically pursued the objective of “enforcing peace” and failed, but because political problems quickly piled up to an extent that called into question the feasibility and wisdom of such an approach. The most important of these was the diverging interests of the protagonists – the Congolese government, the FIB troop contributors and MONUSCO – which could be expected to recur in similar form in other cases. Another problem that emerged was the interests of the traditional troop-providing countries, most of which oppose a “militarisation” of UN peacekeeping on account of the risks associated with robust peacekeeping. In ongoing operations these countries and their troops decide themselves how much force they are prepared to use, regardless of what the mandate and the UN Secretariat tell them. This issue is unlikely to be resolved. The often-repeated suggestion that Security Council members should involve troop contributors more strongly in formulating mandates, in order to achieve more realistic mandates and more binding implementation, will not change that.
In any case, Chapter VII mandates, which legitimise the use of military force, already grant MONUSCO and other peace missions adequate possibilities to defend their mandate actively and robustly, even against armed groups. The creation of the FIB points instead more to the problem of inadequate implementation of mandates by peace operations, rather than evidence of the consequences of the lack of a mandate for the use of force.
There is still need for a clarifying debate over the appropriate measure of robustness in peacekeeping, and how this should be implemented. A greater degree of robustness is no doubt necessary in some circumstances. But the idea that greater use of force will automatically solve the persistent problems of peacekeeping is an illusion. The causes of the situation in Congo – persistent violence, the existence of numerous armed groups and an ineffectual state – are political. They need to be understood and tackled as an interconnected set of factors. Unfortunately, the present trend in peacekeeping is in the opposite direction, namely to isolate individual problems from their political context. This is reflected for example in the almost excessive attention given by UN missions to the question of what they can do themselves to protect civilians (and other priority tasks). This is not to downgrade the importance of PoC. MONUSCO has generated important innovations in that respect, some of which will be emulated elsewhere. Unfortunately, however, they only tackle symptoms, and ineffectively. It would be more promising to ask what MONUSCO and other missions can do to influence the political environment such that civilian populations live in greater security. Then one would arrive at answers that direct attention more strongly towards political and institutional processes and towards local ownership – and thus also towards the government of the host state, an actor that is a partner as well as part of the problem (see also South Sudan).
If, as in Congo, even repeated attempts by a mission to influence political processes fail in the face of resistance by local actors, including the government, focussing on military aspects is nothing but a diversion. As such, it would appear advisable to return to the question of finding appropriate political strategies that can potentially be supported using robust means (should). In that context the relatively new UN concept of “stabilisation” has not proven to be useful. Neither in MONUSCO nor within the UN system as a whole would there appear to be a shared understanding of what stabilisation means. The concept should either be concretised or abandoned.
(Dr. Denis M. Tull is Deputy Head of SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division).
(Concluded)
