Talmiz Ahmad :
THE EAST Mediterranean encompasses Cyprus, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine. In 2010, it had a population of about 45 million, which is expected to go to around 60 million in 2030. This region has been at the heart of global commercial and cultural interactions as the terminus of the old Silk Road. It continues to be at the centre of world energy transit: about five per cent of global oil and 15 per cent of global Liquefied Natural gas (LNG) passes through the Suez Canal annually, while six per cent of world oil transits through the land mass of Turkey and through the Bosphorus Strait. The region also has two small but important pipelines that link the Red Sea with the east Mediterranean: the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline in Israel and the Suez-Alexandria (Sumed) pipeline in Egypt.
Till recently, the region itself was energy-starved and met most of its requirements through imports. This situation changed when in 2010, the US Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that the east Mediterranean basin had undiscovered technically recoverable natural gas of 122 trillion cubic feet (tcf), equal to 3455 billion cubic metres (bcm), as also oil reserves of 1.7 billion barrels. This gas potential can meet the region’s needs indefinitely. A commentator has suggested that the east Mediterranean could become “the next Gulf”, while another has called it “the Middle East’s last hydrocarbon frontier”.
Israel has been in the forefront in developing this potential. It began exploration in the 1990s, but its most significant find came in 2010, the Leviathan field, which has reserves of 22 tcf, which has made Israel self-sufficient in gas for several decades and even able to export. In 2011, Cyprus discovered gas in the Aphrodite field, which has reserves of five tcf. A small gas field abuts Palestine, off Gaza; there are also indications of gas off Lebanon and Syria.
However, the region has its own share of disputes, which impinge on energy development. The Israel-Palestine issue and unresolved Israel-Lebanon problems have meant that the offshore potential of Palestine cannot be developed, while Lebanon believes that Israel’s exploration has encroached into its economic zone. The other obstacle is the Cyprus issue, originating in the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus in 1974, which has divided the island and strained Turkey’s ties with Cyprus and Greece.
Recent developments have also had an impact: the four-year conflict in Syria has ensured that the country is unable to explore and develop its potential; it has also meant that Syria’s allies, Iran and Russia, have asserted their strategic interests in the Mediterranean. Again, from Israel’s perspective, the regional scenario could not be worse: it now needs to ensure the security of its offshore oil and gas assets, even as it has lost its traditional friends, Turkey and Egypt. In this situation, it sees the US retreating from West Asia, while Russia and Iran are expanding their influence. Looking for a new regional alliance to safeguard its interests, it seems to have found it in east Mediterranean’s energy exports.
Israel and Cyprus envisage that, if they were to combine their gas resources (estimated at 1100 bcm), they would be able to develop the required export infrastructure and, through an undersea pipeline, sell their gas in Europe, which is anxious to diversify its imports away from Russia.
Their preferred route to Europe would be via Greece, which would put in place an Israel-Greece-Cyprus axis: though based on energy interests, the nations concerned believe it could evolve into a political and even military bastion to prevent “Eastern Mediterranean [from] becoming an Islamic lake”, as an Israeli scholar has asserted. However, analysts and engineers have raised doubts about the Greek option on technical, commercial and financial grounds, besides the fact that it would pass through the Turkish exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
From the technical and commercial point of view, the best route to Europe would be a direct undersea pipeline from Israel to Turkey, which are itself a major consumer, a regional energy hub and a Nato member. But, this is not acceptable to Cyprus since it would pass through the Cypriot economic zone. Israel too has reservations due to its strained ties with Turkey and concerns about its long-term regional ambitions. The LNG option, also under consideration, is expensive and not yet viable commercially and politically. In the meantime, Israel, after considerable domestic debate, has decided to retain about 60 per cent of its production for domestic use and export mainly to its neighbours, Palestine (West Bank) and Jordan, an unheralded first step in regional reconciliation.
Differences among the countries on the east Mediterranean littoral have already generated some naval skirmishes: in early November this year, just when an international consortium began drilling in Cyprus’s (EEZ), two Turkish war ships arrived with a survey ship to explore the waters off Cyprus. The latter responded with joint naval exercises with Israel. Not to be outdone, Russian naval vessels began exercises 40 nautical miles off Cyprus. East Mediterranean is now the centre of economic, political and maritime competitions; energy has aggravated historic faultlines and rivalries.
However, east Mediterranean has another option as well: shared energy interests and the promise of shared prosperity raise the possibility of a “grand bargain” in the region to resolve its festering problems. This will enable the region to attract developers for cooperative energy projects and trans-national pipelines, handle disputes relating to territorial waters and economic zones, and eliminate the need for military grandstanding. This is the challenge confronting the nations interested in security and stability in the east Mediterranean.
(The author is a former Indian ambassador to the UAE)
