Ibne Siraj :
Russian President Vladimir Putin gave his annual parliamentary address from a position of unparalleled strength as his popularity is sky-high and any opposition seems to have long since given up protesting. He slammed the West for its position on Ukraine, yet his policies there have alienated much of the rest of the world. “Every nation has the sovereign right over his own style of development, over the choice of its allies, its own political, economic, social and security policies. Russia has always respected and will always respect that. And this fully applies to Ukraine,” he said.
Yet in almost the same breath, he insisted that Ukraine held special significance for Russia, which clearly sees it as in a sphere of Moscow influence. “We will not get into an arms race, which is expensive. No one can militarily dominate Russia. Our army is modern, strong and, as we say today, ‘polite’, but it is also feared,” he continued. It was a speech long on sticks but short on carrots, with a second half devoted to Russia’s current economic woes, for which Putin offered few significant ideas or incentives. The decree on long-term economic policy is central to Putin’s program with the core targets being increasing the investment rate to 27 per cent of GDP by 2018 (from the current 21-22 per cent).
He also stresses upon creating 25 million high-productivity jobs by 2020, a 1.5-fold increase in labour productivity by 2018 relative to 2011, and moving up 100 places in the World Bank’s Doing Business Index to 20th position by 2018. Other decrees include a 1.4-1.5-fold increase in real wages by 2018, increased expenditure on research and development (to 1.77 per cent of GDP by 2015, from 1.16 per cent in 2010), and an increase in life expectancy from the current 69 years to 74 years by 2018. The ‘new old’ president did not explain how these targets will be achieved and how much they might cost, but his policies offer an irresistible rationale for generous public expenditure. The package requires a consolidation of existing government programs and the delivery of new ones that will provide the necessary frameworks for public procurement and investment.
Putin has a long-festering grudge, deeply resenting the West for winning the Cold War. He blames the United States in particular for the collapse of his beloved Soviet Union, an event he has called the “worst geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.” His list of grievances is long and he is bitter about what he sees as Russia’s humiliations in the 1990s-economic collapse; the expansion of NATO to include members of the USSR.’s own “alliance,” the Warsaw Pact; Russia’s agreement to the treaty limiting conventional forces in Europe, or as he calls it, “the colonial treaty”; the West’s perceived dismissal of Russian interests in Serbia and elsewhere; attempts to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO and the European Union; and Western governments, businessmen and scholars all telling Russia how to conduct its affairs at home and abroad.
Putin aspires to restore Russia’s global power and influence and to bring the now-independent states that were once part of the Soviet Union back into Moscow’s orbit. While he has no apparent desire to recreate the Soviet Union (which would include responsibility for a number of economic basket cases), he is determined to create a Russian sphere of influence-political, economic and security-and dominance. There is no grand plan or strategy to do this, just opportunistic and ruthless aspiration. He, who began his third, nonconsecutive presidential term in 2012, is playing a long game. Under the Russian Constitution, he could legally remain president until 2024. After the internal chaos of the 1990s, he has ruthlessly restored “order” to Russia, oblivious to protests at home and abroad over his repression of nascent Russian democracy and political freedoms.
In recent years, he has turned his eyes on the “near-abroad.” In 2008, the West did little as his eyes were over Georgia, and the Russian troops still occupy the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions. Ukraine is central to Putin’s vision of a pro-Russian bloc, partly because of its size and importantly because of Kiev’s role as the birthplace of the Russian Empire more than a thousand years ago.
He will not be satisfied or rest until a pro-Russian government is restored in Kiev. He also has a dramatically different worldview than the leaders of Europe and the US. He does not share Western leaders’ reverence for international law, the sanctity of borders, which Westerners’ believe should only be changed through negotiation, due process and rule of law.
The only way to counter Putin’s aspirations on Russia’s periphery is for the West also to play a strategic long game. The West often says that Europe’s reliance on Russian oil and gas must be reduced, and truly meaningful economic sanctions must be imposed, knowing there may be costs to the West as well. The United States and its other allies want the NATO allies bordering Russia must be militarily strengthened and reinforced with alliance forces.
Many western political scientists are openly pleading for curtailing the western investment in Russia and also to expel the country from the G-8 and other forums that offer respect and legitimacy. They also say that the US defense budget should be restored to the level proposed in the Obama administration’s 2014 budget, and the Pentagon directed to cut overhead drastically, with saved dollars going to enhanced capabilities, such as additional Navy ships; U.S. military withdrawals from Europe should be halted; and the EU should be urged to grant associate agreements with Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine.
So far, however, the Western response has been anemic. Putin is little influenced by seizure of personal assets of his cronies or the oligarchs, or restrictions on their travel. The unilateral US sanctions, save on Russian banks, will not be effective absent European cooperation. The gap between Western rhetoric and Western actions in response to out-and-out aggression is a yawning chasm. The message seems to be that if Putin doesn’t move troops into eastern Ukraine, the West will impose no further sanctions or costs. De facto, Crimea’s joining Russia will stand and, except for a handful of Russian officials, business will go on as usual. However, no one wants a new Cold War, much less a military confrontation.
Tacit acceptance of settling old revanchist scores by force is a formula for ongoing crises and potential armed conflict, whether in Europe, Asia or elsewhere. A China behaving with increasing aggressiveness in the East and South China seas, an Iran with nuclear aspirations and interventionist policies in the Middle East, and a volatile and unpredictable North Korea are all watching events in Europe. They have witnessed the fecklessness of the West in Syria. However, Putin’s challenge comes at a most unpropitious time for the West. Europe faces a weak economic recovery and significant economic ties with Russia.
The US is emerging from more than a dozen years at war and leaders in both parties face growing isolationism among voters, with the prospect of another major challenge abroad cutting across the current political grain. Crimea and Ukraine are far away, and their importance to Europe and America is little understood by the public.
Therefore, the burden of explaining the need to act forcefully falls, as always, on the concerned leaders. As President Franklin D. Roosevelt said, “the government includes the act of formulating a policy” and “persuading, leading, sacrificing, teaching always, because the greatest duty of a statesman is to educate.” The aggressive, arrogant actions of the United States and its allies like Israel require strategic thinking, bold leadership and steely resolve at this moment.
