8. Mr Karim, lastly submits, that as per requirement of sub-section (2) of Section 179 of Sarama Ain 2006 the respondent No. 4 has to show that they represent 30% of the total employee available with the bank and for that purpose the respondent No.4 adopted the means of forgery showing the certificate alleged to have been issued by the Human Resources Manager of the petitioner bank and the allegation of forgery and its detection being within the special knowledge of the petitioner bank unlike the other one impleaded as respondent before the respondent No.2. This aspect of the case also warrants an order in favour of the petitioner impleading it as a party to the proceeding.
9. On the other hand, Mr Mahmubul Hoque, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 4 submits with reference to Section 8 of the Industrial Relation Ordinance 1969 and a similar provision for the purpose of registration of a trade union as embodied in section 182 of Bangladesh Srama Ain, 2006, submits that the employer has nothing to do in respect of registration of a trade union and in that case an appeal against an order passed by the Director of Labour who is a necessary party and he is the person to explain what had happened or under what circumstances the order was passed against which the appeal has been preferred, therefore, the presence of the petitioner is not at all necessary as such the courts below rightly refused to impleade the petitioner as respondent in the appeal before the respondent No.2.
10. Mr Hoque, also submits that the case of Palli Daridra Bemochan Foundation vs Palli Daridra Foundation Karmachari Union (proposed) reported in 57 DLR (AD) 155 fits in all the fours in the present case and the said decision has rightly been referred to by the Labour Appellate Tribulation in its impugned judgment.
11. Mr Mahbubul Hoque, submits lastly that section 8 of the Industrial Relation Ordinance which is akin to Section 182 of the Bangladesh Srama Ain, 2006 impliedly indicates who are the parties to be impleaded in an appeal against an order passed by the Director of Labour and the aforesaid provision of law being available in special law. It has to be complied with as has been done by the courts below in the impugned order, therefore, the impugned order do not call for any Interference by this court.
12. We have heard the learned Advocates appearing from both sides, perused the petition, affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondent No.4 and other materials including the two impugned judgments and the decisions referred to by the learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 wherefrom it transpires that an application for registration of trade union was filed before the Director of Labour by the employees of City Bank Ltd and on receipt of the said application for re&istration the respondent No.3 i.e. Director of-Labour made some queries under section 182(2) of the Bangladesh Srama A in,2006 and at the same time Labour Director also sent a copy of the said application to the petitioner bank as contemplated under sub-section (3) of section 178 of the Srama Ain, 2006. In this connection it may be pointed out that sub-section(3) of section 178 is a new insertion in the law for the purpose of registration of a trade union, no such similar provision was available in the repealed of law namely Industrial Relation Ordinance, 1969 and on receipt of the copy of the application the petitioner bank detected forgery in the certificate alleged to have been issued by the Manager, Human Resources Division of the bank and the signature of the said Manager was found to have been forged in the certificate annexed along with the application for registration filed by the respondent No. 4 and in its turn the petitioner bank informed the respondent No.3 that the certificate produced before him for the purpose of registration by the respondent No.4 is a forged one.
It was also informed to the respondent No.3 that a GD Entry had been lodged for forging the signature of the Manager Human Resources Department of the Bank. Upon receipt of the said report from the petitioner bank and upon examination of other circumstances the respondent No. 3 refused to accept the application for registration filed by the respondent No.4. Thereafter, the respondent No.4 preferred an appeal being BLL Appeal No. 199 of 2010 challenging the said order dated 9-12-2010 passed by the respondent No.3 in rejecting the application for registration and in the said appeal the petitioner bank wanted to be added as a respondent with an application for addition of party and the said application was rejected by the Labour Court i.e. respondent No.2 in its order dated 18-4-2011.
13. Challenging the said order of respondent No.2 the petitioner bank preferred appeal No. 349 of 2011 before the Labour Appellate Tribunal but the said appeal also upon hearing by the Appellate Tribunal was dismissed by its order dated 21-11-2011, thereafter the petitioner bank has obtained the present rule.
14. We have also perused the decision cited by the learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 reported in 57 DLR (AD) 155 and on consideration of the facts and circumstances including the laws related therewith we find that the judgment of the Appellate Division in the case of Palli Daridra Bimochan Foundation vs Palli Daridra Bimochan Foundation Karmachari Union, Bangladesh (proposed) was delivered in a case arising out of Section 8 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (since repealed) and the present case is one arising out of Section 182 of the Srama Ain 2006. This two provision are no doubt similar and both are aimed at the purpose of registration of a trade union.
15. We have also noticed, so far as the registration of a trade union under· the Industrial Relation Ordinance, 1969 is concerned there was no provision for invoking assistance of the employer for the purpose but this procedure for collecting information from the employer has been inserted in the new law namely, Bangladesh Srama Ain, 2006 in its provision under sub-section (3) of Section 178 which reads as under :-
(1)
(2)
(3) kªg cwiPvjK A_ev GZ`mswkøó wel‡q `vwqZ¡cÖvß Kg©KZ©v Dc-aviv (1) Gi Aaxb †Kvb `iLv¯Í cvIqvi ci, Dnvi GKwU Kwc (BDwbq‡bi Kg©KZ©v‡`i ZvwjKvmn) mswkøó gvwjK‡K Zvnvi AeMwZi Rb¨ Awej‡¤^ †cÖiY Kwi‡ebt
Z‡e kZ© _v‡K †h, cÖwZóvbcy‡Ái †ÿ‡Î Av‡e`b-Kvixi Li‡P †iwR÷ªvi Ae †UªW BDwbqb KZ©”K BDwbq‡bi Kg©KZ©v‡`i ZvwjKvmn MYweÁwß cÖPv‡ii e¨e¯’v wb‡Z nB‡e|
16. We have also noticed that in view of the new insertion noted as above, the respondent No. 3 issued its memo dated 24-11-2010 to the petitioner bank as per annexure-B and in reply to the same the petitioner bank in its turn issued its memo dated 7-12-2011 (Annexure-B-l) informing the respondent No.3 in the language inter alia :-
ÒD³ Av‡e`b cÎ fzj Z_¨ cÖ`vb, Avgv‡`i cÖwZôv‡bi gvbe m¤ú` Dbœqb e¨e¯’vcK Gi ¯^vÿi Rvj K‡i cÖZ¨qb cÎ cÖ`vb Ges gvbe m¤ú` Dbœqb e¨e¯’vcK Gi ¯^vÿi Rvj K‡i Avcbvi `߇ii mv‡_ cÎ †hvMv‡hvM Kiv n‡q‡Q hv AvBb Abyhvqx kvw¯Í‡hvM¨ Aciva I evsjv‡`k kªg AvBb 2006 †gvZv‡eK ¸iæZi Am`vPviY e‡U|
and in consequence whereof the respondent No.3 rejected the application for registration filed by the respondent No.4 against which the respondent No.4 has preferred BLL Appeal No. 199 of 2010 where the petitioner bank wanted to be added as party .
17. The basic principle of law for addition of party in a proceeding particularly which is of civil nature is that the court concerned has to consider whether the presence of the applicant is necessary for the purpose of adjudication of the dispute in question completely and effectually and in doing so we find that question before the respondent No. 2 is as to whether the order of refusal of registration by the respondent No.3 was done legally and properly and in deciding that question the allegation of forgery in a paper which is the basis of registration and produced by the respondent No.4, is no doubt has a direct bearing in the decision of the said case. Therefore, we find this is a distinguishable feature which was not at all available in the case reported in 57 DLR (AD) 155.
18. In this connection it may also be made clear that in all the cases the presence of the employer may not be necessary for the purpose of deciding a question as is available before the respondent No.2 and in those cases mere presence of the Director of Labour is sufficient but in the present case before us because of the existence of an allegation of forgery and in consequence whereof a GD entry had been made and we have also been informed by the petitioner bank, the matter was sent to the hand writing expert and the expert reported that the signature of the Manager of Human Resources Department of the petitioner bank was forged in the certificate purported to have been issued by him and produced before the respondent No.3 by the respondent No.4 for the purpose of registration of the union and in view of the peculiar circumstances involved in this case we find that the presence of the petitioner before the respondent No.2 may not be necessary yet he is a proper party to assist the respondent No.2 in deciding the point at issue involved in the appeal before him. We find also that unless the question off orgery is decided properly, the question of registration of the union as proposed by the respondent No. 4 is not possible, effectually and completely.
19. Under the facts and circumstances involved in the case we find that the principle of pose of law inunciated by the apex court in the case reported in 57 DLR (AD) 155 is discernible therefore, not applicable in the instant case.
20. In view of what has been stated above, we find that the impugned orders have been passed without application of judicial mind to the facts and circumstances involved in the case as such are not sustainable in law as those have been passed without lawful authority therefore of no legal effect.
Accordingly, the rule is made absolute and the respondent No.2 is directed to implead the petitioner City Bank Limited as one of the respondent before him and to dispose of the application as expeditiously as possible. In this connection it may also be pointed out that the respondent No.2 is expected to take care of the unnecessary delay, if any, attempted by the petitioner in disposal of the appeal pending before him.
