Sergey Ryabkov :
The world is undergoing tectonic shifts accompanied by increased conflict potential, instability and volatility. Former security structures are eroded and replaced by new, more complex forms of interaction. Some countries are overtly striving to reshape the political landscape in order to ensure their dominance over others and substitute international law with a so-called “rule-based world order”. Coercion is acquiring a greater role, with “undesirables” being pressured with tougher sanctions, and extremely harsh, peremptory rhetoric bordering on insult and inconsistent with ways of traditional diplomacy becoming more widespread. As a result, there are fewer opportunities to reach agreement and political compromise.
These international developments are directly related to the missile component. Missile systems have long become an integral part of national, regional, global and outer space security systems, with their share steadily rising. Qualitative development of missile technologies and improved missile performance in terms of strike potential, speed and range make these weapons attractive to states for accomplishing combat tasks and delivering effective strikes, including prompt ones, against a wide range of targets, even the most critical ones. Needless to say, the destructive power of a missile increases manifold when used to deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
According to our estimates, the role of missile technologies is going to increase further. We all will have to take into account the rapidly changing missile realities and respond to them in a timely manner. The world community is hardly ready for the upcoming challenges related to the realm of missile technology. We are short of tools to face them.
On a bilateral basis, the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which was extended earlier this year for a five-year term to 5 February 2026, can be cited as a positive example. The New START Treaty ensures that the core mechanism for maintaining strategic stability, which strictly limits the nuclear missile arsenals of the Parties on the basis of parity, remains in place and continues to operate. Considerable effort will be required to bring the U.S.-Russian dialogue in this area back on track and to achieve new tangible results that would strengthen national security and strategic stability around the world. The second U.S.-Russia inter-agency meeting recently held in Geneva represents a step in this direction.
Unfortunately, the recent decades have seen the erosion of essential treaties, such as the ABM and the INF Treaties, which used to play the key role in ensuring predictability and restraint in the missile sphere at both global and regional levels. Russia had been trying hard to preserve those treaties. In this context, let me remind you of Russia’s moratorium on the deployment of its ground-launched intermediate- and short-range missiles in Europe and other regions of the world provided similar U.S.-produced systems are not deployed there, as well as of our call on NATO countries to consider introducing a reciprocal moratorium and developing reliable verification mechanisms. However, our colleagues from the North Atlantic Alliance do not seem ready to take such steps yet.
As for the multilateral track, here we rely first of all on the MTCR export control mechanisms and some transparency and confidence-building measures under the Hague Code of Conduct. There is also a country-specific ban imposed by the UN Security Council on the DPRK’s activities to develop ballistic missile technologies. The recently-launched informal Berlin Missile Dialogue Initiative is standing somewhat apart. The UN Panel of Governmental Experts on the Issue of Missiles in All Its Aspects, a once-active UN platform for dialogue, has not held meetings since 2008.
Thus, the missile “field” (unlike that of WMD) lacks a global legally binding instrument to contain missile proliferation. The Russian Federation considers the development of such a regime to be a strategic goal. A global missile non-proliferation regime would ensure transparency in implementing missile launches and programmes, as well as eliminate any possibility of unauthorized and uncontrolled transfers of missile technologies from states that possess such technologies to other countries. This global regime would constitute an independent mechanism and complement the existing agreements (the MTCR and the Hague Code of Conduct).
Building on this approach, as early as 1999, Russia introduced an initiative to gradually implement this idea. As an initial step, Russia suggested creating the Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology (GCS). It would have envisaged missile launch transparency, security assurances and economic incentives for states that had renounced means of WMD delivery, as well as consultations. The GCS was expected to be developed and operated on a multilateral basis under the UN auspices. Unfortunately, the initiative saw a limited implementation due to the opposition from a number of states.
Exchange of views on the missile issue at various multilateral platforms shows that our partners do not avoid the topic in principle, but – just like before – are clearly unwilling to be bound by any formal dialogue commitments like the UN Panel of Governmental Experts, let alone more advanced initiatives to establish a global legally binding instrument to prevent missile proliferation.
In these circumstances, we have few viable options left. One of them is for missile possessing countries to engage in a UN-led inclusive informal dialogue based on an open agenda aiming to provide global response to existing missile challenges.
We suggest considering a separate side event parallel to the UN General Assembly First Committee session in 2022 involving experts from missile possessing countries to discuss possible ways forward on the missile issue.
Another option is to increase the MTCR’s potential. This could imply a fast-track admission procedure for missile possessing countries or at least outreach efforts to develop dialogue with these countries, as well as expanding the potential of information sharing with a view to conducting a joint analysis of global trends in the missile area and identifying possible solutions to missile challenges. Yet such a dialogue, if pursued within the current narrow format of the Regime, would be a conversation of the chosen few, with all that it implies.
We understand that the above mentioned list of tasks is extensive and ambitious one. We have no illusions that they can all be addressed at this plenary meeting or even during the entire year of Russia’s chairmanship of the MTCR. Yet we are convinced that it is only through joint effort and respectful dialogue based on equality and consideration of mutual interests that progress on them can be reached.
It is our hope that members of the international community will ultimately realize the need for a broader and more equal dialogue between missile possessing countries.
And one more remark. We regard the MTCR to be a tool to tackle the objectives of preventing the proliferation of the missile technology and related materials. We believe that the Regime should not become an obstacle to lawful technological cooperation between countries on peaceful exploration of outer space or target certain states. The MTCR is intended to help bring all parties together in a spirit of cooperation.
(Sergey Ryabkov is Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The write up is his address at the opening of the Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Sochi, 6 October 2021).
