Dr Jamal Khan :
IF ONE is to understand existing control modalities for human resource management and to suggest fundamental changes in these modalities with the objective of achieving greater effectiveness in personnel management, it is essential to be aware of the origins, rationale for and evaluation of the system. During the colonial period, for instance, personnel management in the public sector, including position/position classification and creation, was vested in the colonial governor and colonial secretary, with appointments and promotions at higher levels being made by the Colonial Office in London. In 1946, the British government indicated to the colonial empire that in keeping with its post-war policy of preparing the colonies for self-government and, subsequently, independence, colonial governors were being asked to establish public service commissions, to advise them while selecting and appointing candidates to the colonial public sectors. The Colonial Office wanted such commissions to be composed in such a way as to command the confidence of the public sector and the general public.
In the 1940s and the early 1950s, the idea was that a civil servant had a right to protection against discrimination, that any disciplinary action taken against him was based on impartiality, and that cabinet ministers should be protected from unscrupulous pressures demanding appointments or promotions for friends and relatives. Hence, the call was clear for the establishment of a service commission whose membership should be entirely outside of political/partisan activities. Around this early time, it was envisaged that the creation of a public service commission would serve as an ingredient of the post-war process of devolution in most of the dependencies. The commission’s primary function would be to advise the government on the regulation of standards of entry into the public sector and to recommend certain candidates for selection to appointments who had achieved minimum standards.
During the decolonisation period, from the 1940s to the 1970s, public service commissions came into being in countries after countries, particularly during the closing years of the embryonic ministerial system and on the eve of the commencement of the fully-functioning ministerial system. Noticeable too, historically, was that with the unfolding of full internal self-government from the 1940s through the 1960s, provision for the commission was included in a given country’s constitution. Such commissions assumed full executive powers when it was entrenched in the independence constitutions of many new nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America.
It is clear that the primary rationale for creating the commission was related to the objective of developing a depoliticised and professional public management with the transfer of power from the Colonial Office to postcolonial cabinets and cabinet ministers. The rationale stemmed, therefore, from an intention to establish an institution composed of impartial and independent individuals, which would serve three interrelated purposes: protecting public personnel against discrimination in respect of appointment, promotion, transfer and discipline; providing all public personnel with equal opportunities and fair treatment on the basis of merit; and avoiding or minimising patronage as the reward for support of a party or politician and nepotism/favouritism from other influential sources. Despite the weaknesses and deficiencies in the operation of the public sector, personnel feel positively about the protection offered by, and the relative impartiality and fairness of, the commission as compared with the likely consequences of entrusting their careers entirely to cabinet ministers or ministry secretaries.
In many developing countries, since the creation of the commission, the separation of the personnel function from the establishment function and the placing of the two functions in two separate organizations became established. The rationales for the establishment functions – the organisation structure of ministries/departments, position classification, position/post grading, staff complement, salaries, service conditions, training policy and superannuation – was that these are policy matters with financial implications and should, therefore, be vested in a minister. On the other hand, the personnel functions – recruitment, appointment, transfer, promotion, training offers and disciplinary process – were placed in an independent, impartial and non-political organisation.
The first set of functions – the more impersonal – were to be separated from the second – the individual/personal. The emphasis of the second-set functions was placed on protection of the civil servant’s career, and career integrity/management. Earlier, the trend was for the personnel and establishment functions to be managed by two separate ministries, traditionally involving the ministry of finance for the establishment functions. Today, in many countries the newer ministry of the public service – conceived in wider terms and held responsible for initiating public sector reform and for modernising management practices throughout the entire sector – has assumed both the functions.
The deficiencies and problems which arise from personnel management fall basically within two areas. One area flows from the traditional division of functions and responsibilities and their assignment to two separate agencies. The other relates to the appointment and operation of each of the two respective agencies. Underlying both are problems and constraints stemming from a tradition of historical over-centralisation and delegation deficit – especially the reluctance of the commission to delegate, devolve and decentralise. The personnel and establishment functions are interrelated and complementary facets of a single entity. Theoretically, however, all these functions and components should be located in a single agency. Some countries/systems have gone for such an integrated framework. Not only is there an interface between and some of these functions, but in certain critical areas there is overlapping. This applies, for instance, to functions concerning recruitment policy and practices, personnel management, performance appraisal, human resource planning, and employee training and development.
Clearly, if the present system is to function effectively and efficiently, a sine qua non is close collaboration, cooperation and coordination between both agencies. In some countries, such as Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore, high-level policy-type coordination structures comprising key agencies and personnel serve the purpose of coordination. In many others, such structures may or may not exist, but they scarcely meet. In such situations of complementary and overlapping jurisdictions, much depends on the goodwill and cooperation of the decision-makers involved at both the top leadership and the general personnel level of the two agencies. If, for example as country experience shows, either indulges in empire-building, turf-fighting, aggrandisement and foot-dragging designed to frustrate progress and momentum, dysfunctional and diversionary consequences will follow. This has been the general experience in the relations between the two agencies in numerous countries, as reported repeatedly by the United Nations Public Administration Network. This experience points to the urgent need for system rationalisation, simplification and streamlining.
As regards the commission, a number of criticisms have been levelled against its approach and operations. The first concerns the emphasis placed by the commission on its judicial-protection role to the neglect of a proactive and dynamic managerial role. The commission tends to move in a sphere more remote from everyday activities than is consistent with the pressures and urgency of modern organisations. It operates, mainly, in a quasi-judicial or magisterial capacity. It does not initiate business in an executive sense or play a problem-solving, creative and innovative role in the public sector. True impartiality depends not such on remoteness from or lack of involvement in issues or questions as on a committed and professional sense of justice equipped with relevant information, a grasp the operational context and a concern for the public interest.
Two, the need for faster, cost-effective and more flexible recruitment and promotional policies, procedures and practices has been echoed many times. The triumph of process over purpose – a consequence of mindless adherence to rule, form, regulation, procedure and over-caution – has tended repeatedly to defeat the primacy and overriding objectives of the agency. Likewise, the merit system seems to have become an end in itself, overriding the need to get jobs done. It has engendered such costly and long delays to get the best candidate that his loss to a more flexible and accommodative employer was ensured.
Three, to be effective, a commission needs to be sensitive to the main policy directives, thrusts, relevance, time and cost. It must maintain a balance, which is sometimes delicate, between two objectives: cooperation with and responsibility to the government in providing the personnel in quantity and quality which is required for meeting programme needs and resisting pressures from politicians, special interests and others who tend to unduly and inappropriately influence the appointment, promotion, transfer and dismissal of public personnel. Hence, the need to move more promptly and flexibly in taking and executing decisions must be vigorously pursued by upholding rationality and fairness and resisting nepotism and favouritism. This is also relevant and significant so that able performers may be incentivated.
Four, the public service ministry, which is counter-parted by the public administration ministry in Bangladesh, has its share of problems, some of which are in its very nature and raison d’être. Similar to how the planning ministry was first construed, the public service ministry was perceived by the line ministries and departments as an elitist agency, top-heavy with high-level staff positions and attracting away the best personnel from the line ministries. Further credence was given to this image by the perception that decisions and actions taken by the new ministry did not sufficiently reflect review and consultation with the operating/functional agencies, but represented, in the main, decision-making from the centre and the top.
Five, priority appears to have been accorded to the ministry’s industrial relations function in many countries to the neglect of other important functions, such as management services, a critical area of need which was emphasised during the formative years of ministerialisation. The emphasis on its industrial relations function may have stemmed from two sources. The first is the intensified industrial action associated with economic downturns, production shortfalls and the energy crisis in the 1970s and the 1980s in many parts of the world. The second contributory factor may have to do with specialised training in and oriented toward industrial relations on the part of some high-level personnel in the ministry. Similar concerns apply to the ministry’s responsibilities for classification and grading which – after the initial flurry of activity occasioned by independence and decolonisation in many countries – got railroaded.
Six, other areas of criticisms include the failure to develop an effective performance appraisal system and to implement such a system – sometimes a joint responsibility with the commission – and inadequacies in personnel management, especially organisation development and management development. However, in respect of the latter, it should be noted that such ministries and their human resource development training centres around the world tend to be fairly active in undertaking and encouraging training programmes, short courses, seminars, workshops and roundtables over several decades.
Seven, it seems that the ineffectiveness of the personnel system is attributable, in part, to problems in the relations among policymakers, staff ministries, line ministries and departments, viz. unprofessional, disrespectful, improper and conflictual communication, weak and unprincipled ministry/departmental personnel management and inertia on the part of personnel in ministries/departments flowing largely from either the absence or insufficiency of lack of participation in decisions about public sector management development.
Given all these, some prerequisites for an improved and more effective human resource management system in the public sector are: rationalisation of the central management system and greater decentralisation of the system. As regards rationalisation, a few modalities may be considered. The personnel function could be fused and assigned to a single integrated agency. Such an agency could be a ministry – such as the public service ministry – or an independent constitutional institution – such as the public service commission. Obvious benefits would accrue to a modality entailing an integrated agency in bringing the complementary and overlapping functions together.
An independent commission, however, may not be truly independent or functional in many developing countries with an authoritarian, undemocratic and non-participative background. Besides, an independent commission without high-level political/policy inputs, support and personnel infusion may experience difficulty in keeping abreast of the government’s policy thrusts and their implications for staffing and other needs. More importantly, it is somewhat unrealistic for significant policy decisions to be removed from political direction, responsiveness and accountability. In any event, the political directorate – always eager to maximise power – could hardly be expected to support and initiate a change of this nature. There would be strong reasons for not supporting it.
(To be continued)
