Dr. Md. Shairul Mashreque :
The scenario of governance conceptually connected with politics of rural development enables us to understand potential barriers to institutional intervention towards poverty reduction. Rural development to reduce poverty cannot be achieved simply through growth with equity indicators and targeted safety-nets. Projected programmes of addressing poverty under millennium development goals (MDG) are difficult to implement.
This contextualism provides much room for the analysis of relational matrix under the condition of seemingly fuzzy governance within the methodological perspective of political economy based on pro-Marxist stance. Plethora of recent studies (Wood 1976, Alavi 1973, Blair 1978and 1985 Huizer 1981, Westergaard 1976, Poulantzas 1975, Umar 1986 and 1987) on development are illuminating with insightful research notes to facilitate understanding of the state of governance that impinges into peasant social fabric. Peasant communities operating within Asiatic mode of production have been encapsulated by feudal or semi-feudalistic pattern of governance. Bangladesh presents a prototype of Asiatic mode of production in a hydraulic structure ruled by the semi-feudal lords and emerging tycoons who use opportunities for investment in capitalistic mode of production. . They have come to constitute a governing class lying at the apex of the community power structure because of high income (including unearned one coming through the channel of corruption), large landholding estate and education.
Some recent socio-economic surveys on rural local communities in Bangladesh conducted by Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development (BARD) and Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies(BIDS) are ‘snap-shots of a vast and complex a vast and complex social formation undergoing a rigorous process of social transformation'(Ahmed 1991:41). Both the surveys present almost similar findings though BARD conducted research with a larger sample. It is clear from the surveys that local governance does not serve the interests of the majority of the peasants. Blair (1987) argues that ‘leaders in any society invariably are elite of one sort or another. Bair compares Bangladesh context with that of West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and and Kerala states of India. However governance situation in Bangladesh is strictly different from that of Indian states. This is because of the fact that some undemocratic culture coupled with military and quasi-military intervention is responsible for ‘blocking the normative development of democratic political institutions. In Bangladesh ‘the petty bourgeoisie has become a dominant social class. The state plays a Bonapartist militarist role (Poulantzas 1975 and Jahangir 1986). There happens to be relative autonomy to ‘keep its political jackets clean and resolve inner contradictions among themselves (traditional petty bourgeoisie and new petty bourgeoisie). Manipulation appears to be function of the governing elites. The contemporary scenario of triangular manipulation is a manipulation by the dominant interest group-the coalition of interests among “governing elites,” “fortune seeking political entrepreneurs” and privileged business communities. Governing elites include both political leadership and bureaucracy. It is seen that governing elites expand various opportunities for economic concentration including rent-seeking ones. It ultimately aggravates the poverty situation threatening the legitimacy of the regime and increasing the probability of regime turn over.
Manipulation has of late degenerated into criminalization. Bangladesh syndrome of criminalization has diverse manifestations like rampant politicization and partisanization, toll extortion, forced occupation of land, commercialization of politics and criminalization of business and syndication. Criminalization started to mushroom in Bangladesh when things stumbled onto misgovernance with state failing to stem the rot.
The propensity to corruption is inherent in misgovernance. Corruption has acquired a pervasive character devouring economy as a whole. This problematic scenario continues to hold tenuously on extremely fragile and soft state. . The consequence is likely to be the generation of catastrophic conditions as well as humanitarian crisis. Corruption in terms of massive societal degeneration put severe strains on the implementation of public policy on various sectors and sub-sectors. Despite effectiveness of the economic policy strategy in rising GDP at a reasonable rate and raising remittance flows corruption has brought into being a set of interrelated and potentially explosive problems. This is reflected in the fast deterioration of material conditions and rising structural tension bedeviling the lives of the vulnerable especially in the countryside. Quddusi (2010) has succinctly analyzed recent trends in criminalization and corruption in a state with military preponderance. It is clear from his study that corruption thrives in the midst of criminalization of politics.
Corrupt practice in various forms continueto engulfs all strategic institutions undermining governance. It is so deeply in field level extensions departments for rural development with the reinforcement of criminalization and syndication that it seems impossible to break its vicious chain. The environment around bureaucracy and political arena has become inordinately vitiated to give way to institutionalization of corruption.
A true dinosaur of corruption has reigned supreme under the manipulative design of fortune seeking rural leaders to weaken political stability and economic resilience. Local touts active in rural politics have been immensely benefited from Machiavellian syndrome of politicization while the honest has been sidelined.
“For decades, the story of Bangladesh has been a cycle of poverty, natural disaster, political violence and corruption.”(Baladas 1991). A policy of patrimonialism followed by successive government in Bangladesh has facilitated corruption (Khan, 1998). Patrimonialism is a system in which the politicians national wealth and resources to enrich themselves creating an affluent class subservient to them through the massive transfer of public wealth to private hands (Moniruzzaman, 1992).
Political leadership actually does not represent the majority of the rural population. The change of political allegiance of local leadership with the change of the ruling regime is evident (Ahmed 1991). Local leadership has turned into a lucrative trade without investment drawing most patronage resources from the ruling regimes. Patronage resources have been usually placed at the disposal of the influential elites including local MPs. There is a great struggle among faction leaders to capture those resources which provide accessibility to development inputs flowing into the locality from different strategic points of the “centre power axis.”
Under the circumstances one can realize the indispensability of decentralized LG system in minimizing the damaging effects of centralization. Poverty reduction as one of the major objectives of the Millennium development goal (MDG) and sustainable rural development(SDG) requires decentralized LG at the micro-level. More, obsolete structures as found in micro public administration constitute a road block to any intervention aimed at economic empowerment of the poor living far below the subsistence level. We have democratic institutions at the sub national level that are more apparent than real and are merely the political fronts of the ‘Kulak clubs’. The poor continue to remain voiceless having no opinion leader to speak out their problems. More, bureaucratically structured field administration as the extension of central command directs development process with communication, information, networking, planning and budgeting.
We talk of autonomy so often as if it were the only variable for the promotion of local governance. Trapped by the illusion of autonomy the continuing malfunctioning of local governance with representative institutions and field administration told heavily on community life immerizing the low income group. The terribly bad shaped democratic institutions plagued by internal strife, impotence and split enabled the field bureaucracy to have strangle-hold over local institutions. Relative autonomy was used only to resolve internal contradiction, manage crisis and serve information needs.
The dysfunctional role of the members of parliament is pertinent to the analysis of fuzzy local governance. They were found using their position to channel development projects into their constituencies. This was obviously for establishing command over patronage resources and mobilizing support base. The urge to share patronage resources was a critical factor in the abiding interests of MPs to see how projects were being implemented. MPs increasingly intruded into local politics when it came to utilization of public funds in their respective constituencies. At the micro level such intervention gave rise to dualism in the implementation of rural development projects. Anyway, the governing class was rather benefited by the centrally determined sectional allocations for development projects. In such an environment local governance was divorced from public purpose, disarrayed by private gains and material interests where ‘dividing line between the ruling party and the opposition was indistinguishable (Sobhan 2006-5).
Of course belatedly the Centre for policy Dialogue (CPD), Local Government Initiative, Campaign for political Reform and other Civil Societies came forward with the ideas of strengthening existing potentials of local self governance. Donor agencies funded policy analysis on the issue of local governance with action research to offer future policy options.
However, it has been increasingly realized by the civil societies that community wide consensus on generic and specific issues of local governance needs to be reached. There needs to be a broad brush initiative with the participation of citizen bodies and community stake holders. The new perspectives in local governance reveal a strong desire for promoting local government initiative with new vision in the ‘art of the state’ to set appropriate agenda of action. Much is left to the proposed Local Government Commission that is expected to take a planned approach to local governance providing a platform for community participation in need based development. The civil societies can only play second fiddles with advisory roles.
(Dr. Md. Shairul Mashreque, Department of Public Administration, Chittagong University)
