Dr Maleeha Lodhi :
What did President Barack Obama’s four-country tour of Asia signify? Was it a ‘reassurance’ visit to calm the anxieties of its allies about America’s commitment to the region? An effort to demonstrate that Washington’s ‘pivot’ strategy is real, not just declaratory? A trip to demonstrate US ability to counterbalance China, but also avoid upending relations with Beijing?
In some measure the visit was all of the above, as some of the news coverage also noted. The twice-postponed trip took place at a time of renewed doubts about the credibility of America’s ‘pivot’, both at home and among its Asian partners. In 2011 President Obama announced what was billed as a strategic policy shift by the planned ‘pivot’ to Asia. This aimed to turn America’s geo-strategic focus away from the Middle East and towards Asia, redirecting resources to the world’s fastest growing region. But the undeclared aim of the ‘pivot’ was to contain China’s rise. That was how Beijing construed the policy and several other nations, especially as America also proclaimed the intention to shift 60 per cent of its naval assets to Asia.
The US rejected suggestions it was pursuing a ‘contain China’ strategy. But some of its actions suggested otherwise. By goading its Asian allies to make territorial claims against Beijing in the South China Sea, Washington fed the perception that it was trying to check China’s growing influence. Beijing’s own actions and extensive maritime claims also fueled regional tensions.
American denials, reiterated by Obama during his trip, have been met by scepticism in Beijing. This was evidenced most recently in remarks by a spokesperson for the National People’s Congress, who said: “The US has stated publicly that it has no plans to contain China and its ‘pivot’ to Asia is not directed at China” but “we want to see if words are matched by actions”.
Meanwhile, the Western policy community also voiced scepticism about Washington’s ‘rebalancing strategy’, but for a different reason. Many asked whether this policy was more talk than reality. One analyst saw the execution of this policy to be “distracted and ambiguous”. Some pointed out that the US cannot simultaneously be “pivoting” and scaling back on defence, as the administration was doing. But there are other factors to consider, which have impacted on the “pivot” policy and led to its fitful and incoherent pursuit. They include Obama’s preoccupation with domestic priorities and, increasingly, his legacy; his view that his principal international responsibility is to manage US ‘retrenchment’; and Washington’s pursuit of economic goals that are at odds with a strategy to counter China’s rise.
Even in his second term Obama has chosen not to be a foreign policy president. His oft-quoted pronouncement about the need for “nation building at home” has shaped his administration’s priorities. His sights have been set squarely on his domestic agenda, which he believes will determine his legacy.
In his first term his focus was on achieving the country’s economic recovery after the 2008 financial crisis – the worst America faced since the Great Depression. But in his second term too, domestic priorities, especially affordable health care, have prevailed over foreign policy.
A second factor that also explains much about Obama’s global strategy is his view that, at a time of changing global power dynamics, his main role is to handle America’s ‘retrenchment’. As David Sanger recently revealed in the New York Times, “Obama acknowledges, at least in private that he is managing an era of American retrenchment”.
Scaling back America’s global role to conform to new global realities and pressing domestic problems has also meant Obama has tried to align foreign policy to public opinion at home, weary of wars and external overreach.
A third, very different factor to have impacted on the ‘pivot’ is the obvious paradox in an approach that seeks to counter Chinese dominance in Asia while also trying not to upset relations with America’s indispensable economic partner. Trade between the two countries runs into hundreds of billions of dollars a year. And it is by no means the only economic equity in this relationship. Chinese diplomats often point to this policy contradiction, and argue that America’s growing economic ties with China, driven by self-interest, help to empower the country they also want to ‘contain’.
So the question the ‘pivot’ strategy raises for the future is whether by pursuing this, the US risks ending up with the worst of both worlds, neither able to satisfy its allies nor prevent turbulence in its ties with Beijing.
(Dr Maleeha Lodhi is a former Pakistani ambassador to the US and UK)
