Abu Salem Hussain :
Philosophers have offered a range of positions or questions. With regard to the problem of defining terrorism, the dominant approach seeks to acknowledge the core meaning “terrorism” has in common use. Terrorism is understood as a type of violence. Terrorism is usually understood as a type of violence. This violence is not blind or sadistic, but rather aims at intimidation and at some further political, social, or religious goal or, more broadly, at coercion. Terrorism is, in the broadest sense, the use of intentional violence, generally against civilians, for political purposes. It is used in this regard primarily to refer to violence during peacetime or in context of war against noncombatants. Terrorism is a charged term. It is often used with the connotation of something that is “morally wrong”.
Governments and non-state groups use the term to abuse or denounce opposing groups. Varied political organisations have been accused of using terrorism to achieve their objectives. These organisations include right-wing and left-wing political organisations, nationalist groups, religious groups, revolutionaries and ruling governments. philosophy focuses on two fundamental-and related-questions. The first is conceptual: What is terrorism? The second is moral: Can terrorism ever be morally justified? There are ethical challenges we cannot ignore. From Plato and Aristotle on courage to Kant on revenge, to 20th Century Philosopher John Rawls’s views on justice, Govier mines the world of philosophy to reflect on terrorism. Govier argues that moral complexities such as victimhood, evil, power and revenge, if properly understood, can provide a basis for hope-not despair. Govier walks the reader through this shift, challenging us to construct a new sense of the world and our place within it. Terrorism is not legally defined in all jurisdictions; the statutes that do exist, however, generally share some common elements. Terrorism involves the use or threat of violence and seeks to create fear, not just within the direct victims but among a wide audience. The causes of terrorism appeared to be varied. There does not appear to be one lone factor that leads people to engage in acts of terror. Scholars have categorised motivations for terrorism to include psychological, ideological, and strategic.
Terrorism is more of socially constructed term with multiple definitions and originates from a variety of sources and directions. On the other hand it is necessary to develop an operational definition. More personal or individual-based reasons for terrorism are frustration, deprivation, negative identity, narcissistic rage, and or moral disengagement. To involve the premeditation terrorist acts which are motivated by some political or social agenda, terrorists generally target non-combatants or civilians and are generally sub-national or clandestine groups. The configuration of terrorist groups is generally dependent on one’s environment, relationship with the state, motivation and or goals. Involving premeditation terrorist acts which are motivated by some political or social agenda, terrorists generally target non-combatants or civilians and are generally sub-national or clandestine groups. The configuration of terrorist groups is generally dependent on one’s environment, relationship with the State, motivation and or goals.
So we need to be familiar with the five types of terrorism. State-Sponsored terrorism, which consists of terrorist acts on a state or government by a state or government. Dissent terrorism, which are terrorist groups which have rebelled against their government. Terrorists and the Left and Right, which are groups rooted in political ideology. Religious terrorism, which are terrorist groups which are extremely religiously motivated and Criminal Terrorism, which are terrorists acts used to aid in crime and criminal profit. Because we know that the purpose of terrorism is to exploit the media in order to achieve maximum attainable publicity as an amplifying force multiplier in order to influence the targeted audience in order to reach short- and midterm political goals and or desired long-term end states. Terrorist attacks are often justified by their perpetrators on the basis that victims are complicit in some policy or action which is worthy of being met with by violence. But how should we view such arguments from a philosophical perspective? while terrorists are likely to portray their actions as a morally justified ‘armed struggle’, the indirect contribution of the victims’ acts to the contested policies, insufficiently voluntary character of these acts, and the disproportionate nature of the violence inflicted on victims ensures that we can reject these arguments and legitimately condemn such attacks as ‘terrorism’. How might one seek to justify morally some act or campaign of terrorism? One might argue that although the direct victims are ordinary citizens, they aren’t innocent of the wrongs the terrorists are fighting against.
Alternatively, one might concede the innocence of those victims and argue that attacks on them are nevertheless morally justified, either by their good consequences on balance, or by some other moral considerations. Despite this, ‘terrorism’ remains a contested and difficult concept. The reasons for this are obvious: ‘terrorism’ is a highly charged term often used in rhetorical and inconsistent ways. Philosophical debate has focused on two related areas. Firstly, how terrorism should be defined. This debate has revolved around four broad questions: Who are the victims of terrorism? Who are its agents or perpetrators? What are the distinctive ends or goals of terrorism? What are its tactical or operational features? Secondly, the moral evaluation of terrorism. A key question here is whether terrorism is always wrong, or whether there can be cases in which it is morally justified. The scope and importance of any moral assessment of terrorism depends on just what is meant by “terrorism”. The usage over the two centuries or so since the term entered political and moral discourse in the West has been notoriously confusing, fraught with moral emotions and political passions, and plagued by relativism and double standards. Most definitions of terrorism crafted by philosophers acknowledge the two traits that make up the core concept underlining all shifts in descriptive and evaluative meaning: terrorism is violence aiming at intimidation (fear, terror).
Beyond this, philosophers tend to disagree, most importantly on whether terrorism is violence against civilians (non-combatants, innocent people), or can also target members of the military and security services and highly placed government officials. This is the question of a narrow vs. wide definition. A wide definition is in line with common use over two centuries, whereas a narrow definition is revisionary. Yet a narrow definition may be more appropriate in the context of moral assessment of violence and terrorism. Surely there is a considerable moral difference between planting a bomb in an office of an extremely oppressive government and killing a number of its officials, and planting a bomb in a coffee shop and killing a number of common citizens. Are acts of terror always evil? The answer to this question, oddly enough, depends on a rather ill-understood moral principle, invented by Catholic casuists in the Middle Ages, called the doctrine of double effect. The doctrine of double effect, which can be traced back to Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, applies to any sort of act that has two kinds of effects, good and evil. By its logic, such an act is morally allowable only when the following conditions are fulfilled: The agent is aiming only at the good effect; the evil effect is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends; and the consequences of the act are good on balance; that is, the goodness of the good effect outweighs the evil of the evil effect.
There are plenty of contemporary moral philosophers who are unhappy with the doctrine of double effect. Some, Peter Singer, for example, reject it because they think the distinction between directly intended effects and inevitable side effects is a contrived one. If you ask the terror bomber why he is killing civilians, he will say, “To win a just war.” He might even say that he does not need the civilians actually to be dead, but only to be thought to be dead until the war is over to demoralise the other side. If his victims could be miraculously brought back to life after the end of the struggle, he would not object. In this sense, he does not really intend their deaths. Now a question is that what moral restrictions apply to the conduct of counterterrorist operations? Ethically, it is necessary that those combating terrorism refrain from indiscriminately killing, maiming, or imprisoning persons who are unrelated to the terrorist activities. Additionally, there are moral restrictions on means as well as ends. [Second part of the article will be published tomorrow].
(Abu Salem Hussain, Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, University of Barishal; e-mail: [email protected])
Philosophers have offered a range of positions or questions. With regard to the problem of defining terrorism, the dominant approach seeks to acknowledge the core meaning “terrorism” has in common use. Terrorism is understood as a type of violence. Terrorism is usually understood as a type of violence. This violence is not blind or sadistic, but rather aims at intimidation and at some further political, social, or religious goal or, more broadly, at coercion. Terrorism is, in the broadest sense, the use of intentional violence, generally against civilians, for political purposes. It is used in this regard primarily to refer to violence during peacetime or in context of war against noncombatants. Terrorism is a charged term. It is often used with the connotation of something that is “morally wrong”.
Governments and non-state groups use the term to abuse or denounce opposing groups. Varied political organisations have been accused of using terrorism to achieve their objectives. These organisations include right-wing and left-wing political organisations, nationalist groups, religious groups, revolutionaries and ruling governments. philosophy focuses on two fundamental-and related-questions. The first is conceptual: What is terrorism? The second is moral: Can terrorism ever be morally justified? There are ethical challenges we cannot ignore. From Plato and Aristotle on courage to Kant on revenge, to 20th Century Philosopher John Rawls’s views on justice, Govier mines the world of philosophy to reflect on terrorism. Govier argues that moral complexities such as victimhood, evil, power and revenge, if properly understood, can provide a basis for hope-not despair. Govier walks the reader through this shift, challenging us to construct a new sense of the world and our place within it. Terrorism is not legally defined in all jurisdictions; the statutes that do exist, however, generally share some common elements. Terrorism involves the use or threat of violence and seeks to create fear, not just within the direct victims but among a wide audience. The causes of terrorism appeared to be varied. There does not appear to be one lone factor that leads people to engage in acts of terror. Scholars have categorised motivations for terrorism to include psychological, ideological, and strategic.
Terrorism is more of socially constructed term with multiple definitions and originates from a variety of sources and directions. On the other hand it is necessary to develop an operational definition. More personal or individual-based reasons for terrorism are frustration, deprivation, negative identity, narcissistic rage, and or moral disengagement. To involve the premeditation terrorist acts which are motivated by some political or social agenda, terrorists generally target non-combatants or civilians and are generally sub-national or clandestine groups. The configuration of terrorist groups is generally dependent on one’s environment, relationship with the state, motivation and or goals. Involving premeditation terrorist acts which are motivated by some political or social agenda, terrorists generally target non-combatants or civilians and are generally sub-national or clandestine groups. The configuration of terrorist groups is generally dependent on one’s environment, relationship with the State, motivation and or goals.
So we need to be familiar with the five types of terrorism. State-Sponsored terrorism, which consists of terrorist acts on a state or government by a state or government. Dissent terrorism, which are terrorist groups which have rebelled against their government. Terrorists and the Left and Right, which are groups rooted in political ideology. Religious terrorism, which are terrorist groups which are extremely religiously motivated and Criminal Terrorism, which are terrorists acts used to aid in crime and criminal profit. Because we know that the purpose of terrorism is to exploit the media in order to achieve maximum attainable publicity as an amplifying force multiplier in order to influence the targeted audience in order to reach short- and midterm political goals and or desired long-term end states. Terrorist attacks are often justified by their perpetrators on the basis that victims are complicit in some policy or action which is worthy of being met with by violence. But how should we view such arguments from a philosophical perspective? while terrorists are likely to portray their actions as a morally justified ‘armed struggle’, the indirect contribution of the victims’ acts to the contested policies, insufficiently voluntary character of these acts, and the disproportionate nature of the violence inflicted on victims ensures that we can reject these arguments and legitimately condemn such attacks as ‘terrorism’. How might one seek to justify morally some act or campaign of terrorism? One might argue that although the direct victims are ordinary citizens, they aren’t innocent of the wrongs the terrorists are fighting against.
Alternatively, one might concede the innocence of those victims and argue that attacks on them are nevertheless morally justified, either by their good consequences on balance, or by some other moral considerations. Despite this, ‘terrorism’ remains a contested and difficult concept. The reasons for this are obvious: ‘terrorism’ is a highly charged term often used in rhetorical and inconsistent ways. Philosophical debate has focused on two related areas. Firstly, how terrorism should be defined. This debate has revolved around four broad questions: Who are the victims of terrorism? Who are its agents or perpetrators? What are the distinctive ends or goals of terrorism? What are its tactical or operational features? Secondly, the moral evaluation of terrorism. A key question here is whether terrorism is always wrong, or whether there can be cases in which it is morally justified. The scope and importance of any moral assessment of terrorism depends on just what is meant by “terrorism”. The usage over the two centuries or so since the term entered political and moral discourse in the West has been notoriously confusing, fraught with moral emotions and political passions, and plagued by relativism and double standards. Most definitions of terrorism crafted by philosophers acknowledge the two traits that make up the core concept underlining all shifts in descriptive and evaluative meaning: terrorism is violence aiming at intimidation (fear, terror).
Beyond this, philosophers tend to disagree, most importantly on whether terrorism is violence against civilians (non-combatants, innocent people), or can also target members of the military and security services and highly placed government officials. This is the question of a narrow vs. wide definition. A wide definition is in line with common use over two centuries, whereas a narrow definition is revisionary. Yet a narrow definition may be more appropriate in the context of moral assessment of violence and terrorism. Surely there is a considerable moral difference between planting a bomb in an office of an extremely oppressive government and killing a number of its officials, and planting a bomb in a coffee shop and killing a number of common citizens. Are acts of terror always evil? The answer to this question, oddly enough, depends on a rather ill-understood moral principle, invented by Catholic casuists in the Middle Ages, called the doctrine of double effect. The doctrine of double effect, which can be traced back to Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, applies to any sort of act that has two kinds of effects, good and evil. By its logic, such an act is morally allowable only when the following conditions are fulfilled: The agent is aiming only at the good effect; the evil effect is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends; and the consequences of the act are good on balance; that is, the goodness of the good effect outweighs the evil of the evil effect.
There are plenty of contemporary moral philosophers who are unhappy with the doctrine of double effect. Some, Peter Singer, for example, reject it because they think the distinction between directly intended effects and inevitable side effects is a contrived one. If you ask the terror bomber why he is killing civilians, he will say, “To win a just war.” He might even say that he does not need the civilians actually to be dead, but only to be thought to be dead until the war is over to demoralise the other side. If his victims could be miraculously brought back to life after the end of the struggle, he would not object. In this sense, he does not really intend their deaths. Now a question is that what moral restrictions apply to the conduct of counterterrorist operations? Ethically, it is necessary that those combating terrorism refrain from indiscriminately killing, maiming, or imprisoning persons who are unrelated to the terrorist activities. Additionally, there are moral restrictions on means as well as ends. [Second part of the article will be published tomorrow].
(Abu Salem Hussain, Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, University of Barishal; e-mail: [email protected])
