Jusuf Wanandi :
The future of Asian power was the main theme of the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) annual meeting on July 4, 2014, entitled “Asian Game-changer: Incremental Growth-A Germany every 3.5 years”. How should we consider this so-called game-changer, namely the continued shift in economic gravity from West to East? Below are some of my thoughts.
The incremental growth of Asia, and especially East Asia, will indeed be a game-changer in the next 25 years. But growth should be conceived as a long-term objective with a focus on short-term goals. Growth over the next 25 years is one thing; becoming a global big-hitter is another thing entirely. Yet this shift in gravity will bring about change at all levels of human life, and that might also bring about changes in the international and regional hierarchy.
Economic change comes first, and may be the harbinger of wider change. Following a period of economic change, other fields will follow: politics, society and culture, and also security and military power. If the process of change is evolutionary with no big shocks, such as war or major natural disasters, then the essence of the value-system and regional and global order will be maintained. And even with many systemic changes, the game-changer can occur as forecasted. While this is based on the existing system of international order laid down by the West, Asia will provide a lot of input as well, particularly China in the longer term.
Two main problems could constrain the development of the Asian game-changer: new strategic developments and the domestic challenges faced by the big Asian players.
There is valid doubt over whether the competition and cooperation principles between the US and China will hold in light of events that have taken place in East Asia over the last few years. These developments have raised a lot of questions as to the future relations between China and the US and the subsequent impact on peace and stability in the region and worldwide.
Many have speculated that the situation may resemble the Europe of the late 19th century: strong economic relations but fragile political-military cooperation. Yet today’s situation does differ from that of 100 years ago, aside from some formal similarities.
There are now nuclear weapons with the potential for a devastating impact on both conflicting parties and the world in the event of war. The integration of the two economies has become much deeper, though, and is still continuing. The regional institutions are maintaining relations through dialogue and CBMs (confidence-building measures). Is this enough? No! The relationship between the two great powers, China and the US, is critical and needs to improve.
There is no trust between them, and despite the limitations mentioned above that may avert war, the situation could become serious if the military might of both were to reach an equal state in the next decade. The so-called new model of big powers relations agreed upon by both powers in 2013 in California has not been worked out into systematic programs.
Another potential impediment to Asian strategic development is Sino-Japanese relations and competition. For the first time in history, both countries have become great powers, albeit uneven and not at the same level of overall power.
For the next decade or so, Japan will remain an ally of the US, and it has always been the US that calls the shots in the alliance, especially when it comes to defense and military issues. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is trying to slowly build Japan’s own military force, but there is still formidable public opposition.
He has complicated matters by trying to shine a historical light on his efforts to build up self-reliance in defense, and in so doing so makes clear his own belief in the righteousness of expansionist Japan’s ambition toward East Asia eight decades ago. He would have done better to base his efforts on Japan’s 60 years of peace, democracy and openness.
Abe’s efforts have inflamed Chinese and Korean opposition, and other countries in the region, including in Southeast Asia, who reject the idea of future Japanese “self-reliance”. Even the US was not amused by Abe’s approach. He is now trying to put forward his ideas and plans in a more low-key manner, which should help pacify the region somewhat, but he should not forget that his idea is still anathema. Abe may squander all the recognition and appreciation that Japan enjoys for having been democratic, liberal-capitalistic and pacifist for the last 70 years. If Japan is going to become more independent in its defense posture and policies, which is only natural for a country of its size and achievements, it should first work toward improvements in its relationship with other countries in the region, and especially with China and Korea.
There are worries over potential accidents occurring from the stand off over Diaoyou/ Senkaku Island. Most urgent, therefore, is for both Japan and China to establish and to expand direct communication between themselves, including between the leaders and the militaries. In addition, they must agree on the rules of their game.
On domestic challenges, I shall take three big emerging countries as examples: China, India and Indonesia.
The Chinese domestic impediment is the discrepancy between its economic and political development, not the issue of Western democracy against an authoritarian system or the Beijing Consensus system. Can the Chinese system, with an absolute one party system, be open and flexible enough when the economic system needs it, such as in the cases of corruption at the highest and regional levels?
How to cope with decreasing economic growth combined with people’s higher expectations? How to cope with the chauvinism and ultra-nationalism the government has created as a substitute for communist ideology? On the economic front, there is a need for jobs, problems of poverty alleviation, pollution, urbanization and reform of the financial sector.
China, however, should be more than capable of continuing to cope with the issues of the economic sphere, despite the bigger problems stemming from the successes of economic development. But there are questions being asked about political change, especially because of China’s size and her history of five millennia of civilization. These could be the factors that hamper change.
As regards to foreign policy, China’s new assertiveness could become a problem for the region and eventually for China itself. China is big; therefore, she has to restrain herself, and as a great power has to be more magnanimous by giving a little to others besides taking care of her own interests. Deng Xiaoping is right: to ensure a peaceful rise, China must create common interests and engage in common pursuits with her neighbors.
If she fails in this, China risks seeing a united front, including the US, lining up against her. That could be a real impediment to future development as the two sides need one another, and need peace in the region to develop.
China’s success in its development is down to the open international economic system, and it should bear this in mind for future improvements. Its economic role has become very important for the region and the world, and it should keep it that way. In the foreign policy context, it has also benefitted from the existing regional institutions, and she should now take a bigger role in making it possible for the Asian game-changer to become a reality. Thus, these regional institutions could be the instrument to create CBMs and prevent future confrontation.
The election of Narendra Modi has given India a real opportunity to be an important part of the game-changing. Modi’s administration of Gujarat had led to a successful regional economy, and now he has to direct his ambition and political power to bringing this success story to the whole nation.
However, the national stage is not as easy as the regional one. Modi’s constraints abound: the bureaucracy, the diversity of regions and states, the caste-system and poor infrastructure. His other constraint is his ideological tendency toward Hindu extremism, which could limit his capacity to unite the whole nation, including Muslims.
(To be continued)
(Jusuf Wanandi, Vice Chair, Board of Trustees, CSIS Foundation, Jakarta)
The future of Asian power was the main theme of the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) annual meeting on July 4, 2014, entitled “Asian Game-changer: Incremental Growth-A Germany every 3.5 years”. How should we consider this so-called game-changer, namely the continued shift in economic gravity from West to East? Below are some of my thoughts.
The incremental growth of Asia, and especially East Asia, will indeed be a game-changer in the next 25 years. But growth should be conceived as a long-term objective with a focus on short-term goals. Growth over the next 25 years is one thing; becoming a global big-hitter is another thing entirely. Yet this shift in gravity will bring about change at all levels of human life, and that might also bring about changes in the international and regional hierarchy.
Economic change comes first, and may be the harbinger of wider change. Following a period of economic change, other fields will follow: politics, society and culture, and also security and military power. If the process of change is evolutionary with no big shocks, such as war or major natural disasters, then the essence of the value-system and regional and global order will be maintained. And even with many systemic changes, the game-changer can occur as forecasted. While this is based on the existing system of international order laid down by the West, Asia will provide a lot of input as well, particularly China in the longer term.
Two main problems could constrain the development of the Asian game-changer: new strategic developments and the domestic challenges faced by the big Asian players.
There is valid doubt over whether the competition and cooperation principles between the US and China will hold in light of events that have taken place in East Asia over the last few years. These developments have raised a lot of questions as to the future relations between China and the US and the subsequent impact on peace and stability in the region and worldwide.
Many have speculated that the situation may resemble the Europe of the late 19th century: strong economic relations but fragile political-military cooperation. Yet today’s situation does differ from that of 100 years ago, aside from some formal similarities.
There are now nuclear weapons with the potential for a devastating impact on both conflicting parties and the world in the event of war. The integration of the two economies has become much deeper, though, and is still continuing. The regional institutions are maintaining relations through dialogue and CBMs (confidence-building measures). Is this enough? No! The relationship between the two great powers, China and the US, is critical and needs to improve.
There is no trust between them, and despite the limitations mentioned above that may avert war, the situation could become serious if the military might of both were to reach an equal state in the next decade. The so-called new model of big powers relations agreed upon by both powers in 2013 in California has not been worked out into systematic programs.
Another potential impediment to Asian strategic development is Sino-Japanese relations and competition. For the first time in history, both countries have become great powers, albeit uneven and not at the same level of overall power.
For the next decade or so, Japan will remain an ally of the US, and it has always been the US that calls the shots in the alliance, especially when it comes to defense and military issues. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is trying to slowly build Japan’s own military force, but there is still formidable public opposition.
He has complicated matters by trying to shine a historical light on his efforts to build up self-reliance in defense, and in so doing so makes clear his own belief in the righteousness of expansionist Japan’s ambition toward East Asia eight decades ago. He would have done better to base his efforts on Japan’s 60 years of peace, democracy and openness.
Abe’s efforts have inflamed Chinese and Korean opposition, and other countries in the region, including in Southeast Asia, who reject the idea of future Japanese “self-reliance”. Even the US was not amused by Abe’s approach. He is now trying to put forward his ideas and plans in a more low-key manner, which should help pacify the region somewhat, but he should not forget that his idea is still anathema. Abe may squander all the recognition and appreciation that Japan enjoys for having been democratic, liberal-capitalistic and pacifist for the last 70 years. If Japan is going to become more independent in its defense posture and policies, which is only natural for a country of its size and achievements, it should first work toward improvements in its relationship with other countries in the region, and especially with China and Korea.
There are worries over potential accidents occurring from the stand off over Diaoyou/ Senkaku Island. Most urgent, therefore, is for both Japan and China to establish and to expand direct communication between themselves, including between the leaders and the militaries. In addition, they must agree on the rules of their game.
On domestic challenges, I shall take three big emerging countries as examples: China, India and Indonesia.
The Chinese domestic impediment is the discrepancy between its economic and political development, not the issue of Western democracy against an authoritarian system or the Beijing Consensus system. Can the Chinese system, with an absolute one party system, be open and flexible enough when the economic system needs it, such as in the cases of corruption at the highest and regional levels?
How to cope with decreasing economic growth combined with people’s higher expectations? How to cope with the chauvinism and ultra-nationalism the government has created as a substitute for communist ideology? On the economic front, there is a need for jobs, problems of poverty alleviation, pollution, urbanization and reform of the financial sector.
China, however, should be more than capable of continuing to cope with the issues of the economic sphere, despite the bigger problems stemming from the successes of economic development. But there are questions being asked about political change, especially because of China’s size and her history of five millennia of civilization. These could be the factors that hamper change.
As regards to foreign policy, China’s new assertiveness could become a problem for the region and eventually for China itself. China is big; therefore, she has to restrain herself, and as a great power has to be more magnanimous by giving a little to others besides taking care of her own interests. Deng Xiaoping is right: to ensure a peaceful rise, China must create common interests and engage in common pursuits with her neighbors.
If she fails in this, China risks seeing a united front, including the US, lining up against her. That could be a real impediment to future development as the two sides need one another, and need peace in the region to develop.
China’s success in its development is down to the open international economic system, and it should bear this in mind for future improvements. Its economic role has become very important for the region and the world, and it should keep it that way. In the foreign policy context, it has also benefitted from the existing regional institutions, and she should now take a bigger role in making it possible for the Asian game-changer to become a reality. Thus, these regional institutions could be the instrument to create CBMs and prevent future confrontation.
The election of Narendra Modi has given India a real opportunity to be an important part of the game-changing. Modi’s administration of Gujarat had led to a successful regional economy, and now he has to direct his ambition and political power to bringing this success story to the whole nation.
However, the national stage is not as easy as the regional one. Modi’s constraints abound: the bureaucracy, the diversity of regions and states, the caste-system and poor infrastructure. His other constraint is his ideological tendency toward Hindu extremism, which could limit his capacity to unite the whole nation, including Muslims.
(To be continued)
(Jusuf Wanandi, Vice Chair, Board of Trustees, CSIS Foundation, Jakarta)
