Joseph Camilleri :
Alarm bells are ringing a mere three months into Donald Trump’s presidency. The two global flashpoints, Syria and North Korea, are worrying enough. More troubling still are America’s relations with Russia and China. These are now mired in angst, uncertainty and mutual suspicion. They underlie the failure to create a viable system of crisis prevention and crisis management.
Trump’s first 100 days as president have dramatically demonstrated this failure. For all the rhetoric about ‘making America great again’, Trump is rapidly discovering that the US has limited capacity to impose its will on the rest of world. The trend is visible everywhere – in international trade and finance, diplomacy, and numerous conflicts around the world. In Russia and China, the US now faces two centres of power that are no longer willing to comply with America’s interests and priorities. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has been busy reasserting its influence after years of humiliation following the break-up of the Soviet Union. Starting from a low base, China has sustained over the last three decades the most remarkable rate of economic growth in modern history. Now it is seeking to exert the political influence commensurate with its new economic status.
America’s relative political decline goes back to its military defeat in Vietnam. Temporarily obscured by the end of the Cold War, it became fully apparent during the Bush and Obama years. But Trump is the first president to have run on a platform openly stating that the US is in decline and promising to reverse the trend. On the international stage, he has chosen to rely on showing off America’s unmatched military might. Soon after taking office, Trump gave the military expanded authority in the conduct of operations against Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. In support of the Saudi bombing campaign against Houthi forces in Yemen, the US carried out 70 airstrikes in March alone. In the first two weeks of April, the Trump administration has announced plans to increase US military spending (already four times greater than China’s and nine times greater than Russia’s) by $54 billion; dropped the most powerful non-nuclear bomb in its arsenal on a cave and tunnel complex in eastern Afghanistan; and threatened military action against North Korea.
Yet the utility of military power is diminishing. As one centre of power declines and another rises, new fault lines and tensions emerge, and with them new uncertainties. This helps explain why the US finds it so difficult to set a clear policy direction for relations with Russia and China. In the case of Russia, Trump’s task has been complicated by the findings of the US intelligence community that the Russian government interfered in the 2016 US election.
During his election campaign, Trump repeatedly lambasted China for its currency manipulation and threatened to apply tough restrictions on Chinese exports. Before and immediately after his election he flaunted America’s commitment to Taiwan’s security, and challenged China’s military build-up in the South China Sea. Yet the tone has since changed markedly. The US needs China’s help to have any chance of reining in North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. China’s response has been to increase pressure on North Korea while issuing a stern warning to both parties.
And so, the relationship remains at best unpredictable. As much as China and the US need each other, the hawks in the Trump administration – and there are many – will not easily abandon their plans to contain China.
However, this will halt China’s rise.
So, what does the future hold?
The use and threat of force will do nothing to resolve any of the longstanding conflicts in the Middle East or east Asia.
Trump and Putin lead countries that hold some 14,000 nuclear weapons, or close to 95 per cent of global stockpiles. These arsenals cast a shadow over US-Russian security, which seems likely to darken with the advent of new technologies and rising levels of mistrust and suspicion.
Pursuing “America First” or “Russia First” policies in conditions of such mutual vulnerability is an exercise in futility.
A more profitable course for these three centres of power is to recognise each other’s legitimate interests, expand the opportunities for economic and diplomatic co-operation, and develop a coordinated approach in the management of actual and potential flashpoints.
To bear fruit, such efforts need to have solid foundations – in particular decisive steps to eliminate nuclear weapons, enhance the effectiveness of inter-national law, and strengthen the UN’s capacity for conflict management and peace-building.
Alarm bells are ringing a mere three months into Donald Trump’s presidency. The two global flashpoints, Syria and North Korea, are worrying enough. More troubling still are America’s relations with Russia and China. These are now mired in angst, uncertainty and mutual suspicion. They underlie the failure to create a viable system of crisis prevention and crisis management.
Trump’s first 100 days as president have dramatically demonstrated this failure. For all the rhetoric about ‘making America great again’, Trump is rapidly discovering that the US has limited capacity to impose its will on the rest of world. The trend is visible everywhere – in international trade and finance, diplomacy, and numerous conflicts around the world. In Russia and China, the US now faces two centres of power that are no longer willing to comply with America’s interests and priorities. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has been busy reasserting its influence after years of humiliation following the break-up of the Soviet Union. Starting from a low base, China has sustained over the last three decades the most remarkable rate of economic growth in modern history. Now it is seeking to exert the political influence commensurate with its new economic status.
America’s relative political decline goes back to its military defeat in Vietnam. Temporarily obscured by the end of the Cold War, it became fully apparent during the Bush and Obama years. But Trump is the first president to have run on a platform openly stating that the US is in decline and promising to reverse the trend. On the international stage, he has chosen to rely on showing off America’s unmatched military might. Soon after taking office, Trump gave the military expanded authority in the conduct of operations against Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. In support of the Saudi bombing campaign against Houthi forces in Yemen, the US carried out 70 airstrikes in March alone. In the first two weeks of April, the Trump administration has announced plans to increase US military spending (already four times greater than China’s and nine times greater than Russia’s) by $54 billion; dropped the most powerful non-nuclear bomb in its arsenal on a cave and tunnel complex in eastern Afghanistan; and threatened military action against North Korea.
Yet the utility of military power is diminishing. As one centre of power declines and another rises, new fault lines and tensions emerge, and with them new uncertainties. This helps explain why the US finds it so difficult to set a clear policy direction for relations with Russia and China. In the case of Russia, Trump’s task has been complicated by the findings of the US intelligence community that the Russian government interfered in the 2016 US election.
During his election campaign, Trump repeatedly lambasted China for its currency manipulation and threatened to apply tough restrictions on Chinese exports. Before and immediately after his election he flaunted America’s commitment to Taiwan’s security, and challenged China’s military build-up in the South China Sea. Yet the tone has since changed markedly. The US needs China’s help to have any chance of reining in North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. China’s response has been to increase pressure on North Korea while issuing a stern warning to both parties.
And so, the relationship remains at best unpredictable. As much as China and the US need each other, the hawks in the Trump administration – and there are many – will not easily abandon their plans to contain China.
However, this will halt China’s rise.
So, what does the future hold?
The use and threat of force will do nothing to resolve any of the longstanding conflicts in the Middle East or east Asia.
Trump and Putin lead countries that hold some 14,000 nuclear weapons, or close to 95 per cent of global stockpiles. These arsenals cast a shadow over US-Russian security, which seems likely to darken with the advent of new technologies and rising levels of mistrust and suspicion.
Pursuing “America First” or “Russia First” policies in conditions of such mutual vulnerability is an exercise in futility.
A more profitable course for these three centres of power is to recognise each other’s legitimate interests, expand the opportunities for economic and diplomatic co-operation, and develop a coordinated approach in the management of actual and potential flashpoints.
To bear fruit, such efforts need to have solid foundations – in particular decisive steps to eliminate nuclear weapons, enhance the effectiveness of inter-national law, and strengthen the UN’s capacity for conflict management and peace-building.
(Joseph Camilleri is the Emeritus Professor of International Relations, La Trobe University).
– The Conversation
