Tony Waters :
Since Feb. 1, 2021, Myanmar’s peoples have looked inward, focused on the coup, the battles on the streets of Yangon and Mandalay, economic collapse, and the resumption of highland wars. Left to fester is another looming catastrophe on the western border of Myanmar with Bangladesh, where about 1 million Rohingya refugees forced out of their homes by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military) in 2012 and 2017, wait for a cyclone to drown their camps. Meanwhile, the Bangladeshi government rattles its sabers in The Diplomat, insisting that the burden on Bangladesh is unjust, and must be resolved by the refugees returning to Rakhine State. International actors often agree, pointing out that such “return” policies are consistent with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) policies asserting that return to the home country is preferable to resettlement in a “second country” like Bangladesh, or a plausible third country further afield. But in fact, Voluntary Repatriation Doctrine for refugees is too simplistic, and does not reflect complexities inherent to refugee situations. The result is long-term “temporary” situations like the refugee camps at Cox’s Bazar, which have been opening, shutting and opening since 1978.
Bangladesh does of course have a point, just like a couple dozen other countries hosting large refugee populations today. Refugee hosts do much more to protect the peace than do countries who create refugees in the first place, and those which push refugees back. But refugee host countries always only begrudgingly accept the human victims of their neighbor’s violent excesses. Begrudgingly too, reception countries cooperate with the UNHCR to first protect refugees from forcible repatriation, and second to seek international assistance in the name of “burden sharing,” which is the money needed to maintain the large camps in places like Cox’s Bazar. This happens even as host countries deal with xenophobic resentment about foreigners receiving “free stuff” from the UNHCR. Locals ask, why are foreigners given privileges and assistance that local poor do not receive?
But criticism of refugee hosts like Bangladesh risks making a bad situation even worse. Bangladesh generously allowed 1 million Rohingya to withdraw from ruthless ethnic cleansing operations in Myanmar. For this, the UNHCR passes the hat at donor meetings, seeking to compensate Bangladesh for this hospitality. The amount thrown in the UNHCR’s collection hat for each refugee crisis is typically insufficient to sustain the refugees, which only exacerbates those xenophobic tensions. At which point host countries like Bangladesh threaten deportation, and talk about forcibly repatriating refugees back to the home country using military and police force. This happened most dramatically in the Great Lakes of Africa in 1996-1997, when central African militaries deported about 2 million Rwandans back to Rwanda, while hundreds of thousands fled into the Congolese jungles, where many died of hunger, disease, and violence.
Not a durable solution
Despite Bangladeshi rhetoric, the biggest victims are the Rohingya refugees who are pawns in a greater game which began with the Myanmar military. But their situation is sometimes made worse by insistence on quick voluntary return to Rakhine. Reviewing the Rohingya history of the last 40 years or so calls into doubt the effectiveness of UNHCR and Bangladeshi repatriation policies, which have repeatedly resulted in overly quick repatriations.
The Tatmadaw forced the Rohingya out of Rakhine State in 1978 and into Bangladesh in “Operation Dragon King.” Some 200,000-250,000 left for Bangladesh, with about 180,000 returning later that year as a result of an agreement between the Myanmar [then known as Burma] and Bangladesh governments; 70,000 presumably disappeared into the woodwork. Then the Myanmar authorities in Rakhine in 1991-1992 conducted “Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation” and there was another expulsion by the Myanmar authorities from Rakhine. Again, there were 200,000-250,000 leaving and a quick return of 150,000 negotiated by Myanmar, Bangladesh and the UNHCR. Missing from the accounting were 50,000-100,000. The next mass exodus was in 2012, after which there was another call for return. The 2012 return did not occur as in the past, and fewer Rohingya went back to Rakhine, and the camps remained open. But then came the catastrophic expulsions in 2017: 600,000-800,000 more Rohingya were pushed into Bangladesh following the violent deaths of over 10,000 in Rakhine.
In 2017 the situation became even worse in Rakhine. Civil war erupted when the Arakan Army carved out its own territory which it now governs, with support from the Kachin Independence Army. The Rohingya refugees are still left marooned in the dangerous coastal areas in Cox’s Bazar and not “volunteering” for the UNHCR repatriation programs. Where in Rakhine would they go? The choice is between territories controlled by the Tatmadaw, which expelled them in the first place, or the Arakan Army, which is engaged in a war of its own.
Peacebuilding
Protecting and resettling refugees is one of the greatest war-prevention strategies adopted since World War II. And this is what Bangladesh is indeed contributing to the world. Withdrawing refugees from a violent situation protects them from attack from both the home country which expelled them, but also a host country like Bangladesh, which may appease domestic constituencies by relabeling the refugees as “illegal immigrants,” and therefore eligible for deportation. Hosting refugees is also a war and massacre prevention strategy-though rarely framed as such.
But hosting refugees is dangerous. Refugee camps are always near borders, and refugees are always in opposition to the home government which persecuted them. Refugee camps risk attack by the home country, radicalization of refugee youth, and the militarization of camps for armed groups.
(Tony Waters is Professor of Sociology at Payap University, and Director of the Institute of Religion, Culture and Peace, Chiangmai. He works with Burmese, Karen and other students in the university’s PhD program in Peacebuilding. He is the author of academic books and articles about refugee relief and development such as Bureaucratizing the Good Samaritan, and an occasional contributor to The Irrawaddy. He can be reached at [email protected]).
(To be continued).
