Dr Jamal Khan :
(From previous issue)
Nine, as evidence shows, a regulatory organisation may be headed by a single executive or by several. In some countries, a regulatory may have a committee or collegial form of organisation. It is reasoned that public interest would be better served by group decisions than by those of a single executive. Further, in a collegial form of organisation, there is the possibility of staggering the terms of office of the commissioners. This would permit much-needed continuity and stability. Their terms of office may also be made for a longer period than that of an electoral cycle. This – together with the provision that not all commissioners would be selected from the same political party or interest group or social group – can minimise partisan influence.
More recently, some are in favour of having a single executive head a regulatory agency in order to avoid difficulties of reaching group consensus and fixing accountability, proceduralisation, fluidity and dilatory decision-making. Ten, in view of the fact that regulations affect the life of every citizen and customer and that there is sometimes a general lack of accountability, it is important to protect the regulators as well as the regulatees by providing them with recourse procedures. In this regard, the administrative court – especially a court specifically established for reviewing the decisions of the regulators, for investigating complaints from aggrieved parties, for checking organisational and managerial injustice, excess, insecurity and error, and for mediating and resolving conflicts in a non-adversarial manner – is a useful component of a system of regulatory management.
Finally, each regulatory agency normally specialises in a particular task – and is charged with the responsibility of accomplishing a specific end – which is, far too often, technical by nature. Such agencies normally can attract the specialists, both technical and legal, and can accumulate valuable expertise, experience and insight in their regulatory tasks. Such being the case, the internal situation and the operating culture of a regulatory agency can foster specialised work, technical competence and functional differentiation, promote responsiveness and enhance in-house capacity to deal with regulatory matters effectively and promptly.
Of late, public sector reforms, regulatory reforms, financial reforms, etc have caught attention. Reform efforts can be directed toward a range of routines. Some could go the way of carefully-planned deregulation and decontrol on a selective case basis.
In some instances, some strategic and selective regulatory relief could be provided. Some reforms may involve privatisation, liberalisation and joint sector ventures. Again, a combination of strategies could be followed: reviewing and trimming existing regulations, a slowdown in issuing new regulations, relaxation of enforcement efforts, rationalisation of numerous overlapping and proliferating regulatory agencies, use of cost-benefit analysis in assessing both regulatory improvements and proposed rules and regulations, seeking ways to transfer regulatory authority to mainstream public sector organisations, increased media role, increased civil society and watchdog role, and self-regulation.
A recurrent deficiency in regulatory management is lack of coordination, both among the regulatory agencies and between them and the other public/private sector organisations. Decisions are delayed – sometimes exceedingly while other vital interests suffer – undue influence from interest groups is exerted, and corruption starts, spreads and takes roots. Delays are often attributed to a low level of management capability and paucity of work readiness and organisational alertness.
Delay is often costly to those concerned, but eventually it adversely affects the entire collectivity. The regulatory organisations are, far too often, subjected to pressure from interest and advocacy groups. Either periodically or permanently, a regulatory agency may even become the captive of the sectors/subsectors which the agency is expected to oversee and regulate. All the world over, a prolific research output has grown on the capture theory and has gained popularity in the social science, practitioner, donor, technical-assistance and consulting communities. It is also a well-known fact that corrupt practices are quite common in the regulatory sector of certain countries. It may lack in compliance and enforcement.
It may not have enough clout in respect of decisions, rules and recommendations. Many organisations’ operating procedures may remain archaic, waiting for simplification and streamlining. Necessary policies, plans and practices have not been developed and updated with a view to accelerating regulatory task completions. Organisation, control, coordination and communication remain insufficient in relation to the tasks and challenges at hand.
Reporting to the parliament, the media and people is neither clear and prompt nor regular and dependable. Personnel of high ability, integrity, probity, technical competence and legal skills are not always available nor are they always attracted to such agencies. One runs into problems in securing adequate funding to acquire necessary technology to perform regulatory functions. We should not overlook the unequal relationships – the regulatees, such as groups and interests in the private/corporate sector, multinationals/trans-nationals, big business, private financiers/investors, etc – have resources that are far more impactful and overextending in terms of funding, personnel, specialisation, technology, network, control and influence to those available to a regulatory organisation.
Notwithstanding its importance, recognition, impact and visibility, regulatory management continues to be somewhat more neglected and less studied. Perhaps, the field is not very glamorous! It remains poorly organised and sparsely managed in less developed countries. Not much goes into information management, but when relevant information does get available, it is not much disseminated or shared. Delayed release and availability of statistical data and general information are a chronic problem. Not many seem to grasp the link between regulation and development, often mistaking regulation for negative control, stultification and unproductive behaviour unrelated to development. But the fact is that the maintenance of internal public order, the sustenance of public tranquillity and the establishment of the rule of law make growth, investment, development and empowerment possible and desirable. Generally, growth/development can, and does, take place on a sound and secure foundation of law, order, consistency and predictability.
Regulation and development are not dichotomies. They are the two ends on the continuum. Regulation ensures, implies and presupposes cooperation, control, oversight, protection, legality, enforcement, accountability, compliance, inspection, sanction, safety, reliability, standardisation and fairness. All these attributes are varyingly necessary for growth/development. Regulation and development are mutually reinforcing and complementary and are implicit in each other. The more, for instance, growth, development, empowerment, differentiation and diversification there are, the greater is the need for regulation, i.e. the regulation of trading, commerce, industry, standardisation, market, technology, finance, information, etc. In Bangladesh, we can only dichotomise regulation and development to our peril. Instead, we should take a holistic approach to regulation, which is complemented by development.
(Dr Jamal Khan was professor of public sector management at the University of the West Indies. [email protected].)
(Concluded)
