Ibne Siraj :
Neither India, nor China would like to see the United States having a dominant role in South Asia, Indian Ocean including the Bay of Bengal and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. As a matter of fact, both India, the regional power, and China, world’s one of the biggest economic giants, would consider it better for the United States to play a lesser but cooperative role in South Asia. As a result, most South Asian nations will depend heavily on investments from major economic powers like China, Russia, Japan, the United States and the European Union. Considering the state of affairs in South Asia, what role does the United States want to play? Its South Asia policy does not indicate as of now that it wants to be any part of such developmental processes.
What the US policy towards South Asia presently centres around is how to contain China or to maintain a strong presence in the neighbourhood, which could prevent China from exercising its ‘hegemonic’ tendency. To serve its own interest at any cost, Washington, however, may pursue its foreign policy even to disturb the internal integrity of any South Asian country just like what has been done in many Muslim countries. Having friendship with the United States, Pakistan is already a failed state, Sri Lanka is to fall again into the US trap to distance itself from China and Bangladesh yet to see a good gesture from the world’s biggest power.
The other issue is Afghanistan, which is now a part of the SAARC. With the withdrawal of the bulk of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, the United States would like Afghanistan to remain close to Washington. It is evident that the United States’ South Asia policy will also be attentive to the SAARC nations’ actions vis-àvis Afghanistan. If any South Asian nation opposes the US policy towards Afghanistan, it is likely Washington will react adversely. At the same time, Washington will be trying to organize the South Asian nations to distance themselves as much as possible from both China and Russia, which is not possible.
That policy could lead to some security arrangements; but the South Asian nations must not expect any monetary benefit coming out of such association in the short or mid term. For instance, annual naval exercises like the Malabr exercise under the joint initiatives of India and the United States along with Japan is basically a coordination among the three navies to develop trilateral cooperation that is a necessary countermeasure against the growing naval power of China. It is likely that the United States will make efforts in the coming years to expand this exercise to incorporate some South East Asian nations, as well.
At a Senate Committee hearing, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Nisha Desai Biswal in last July said: ‘We will be doing joint exercises with Japan and India in the MALABAR exercises later this fall. And we see opportunities for increasing the collaboration across Southeast Asia. We are engaging more frequently in consultation and dialogue with the Indians on ASEAN, and look forward to increased and frequent consultation across the East Asia sphere.’ At the same hearing, Lisa Curtis of the Heritage Foundation said: ‘Indo-Japanese ties, in particular, are expected to get a major boost under Modi’s administration since Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe are both increasingly concerned about China and appear prepared to take new policy directions to deal with the challenges posed by Beijing’s rapid military and economic ascendance.’
While these statements cannot be construed as policy statements of Obama, precious little is coming out of Washington that could be identified as well-formulated future US policy towards South Asia. Notwithstanding the Malabar naval exercises, Washington must note that over the decades, India has steadfastly opposed any US military base in Sri Lanka, Maldives or Bangladesh. India’s position on that has not changed and will not change in the foreseeable future. In addition to many individual economic and military contracts and deals that would be trumpeted by media as examples of strengthening India-US ties, the US must note that Modi has already put his emphasis on economic diplomacy as its cornerstone. He will play his ball with every country, China, Russia, United States, Japan and even Pakistan.
The sharp deterioration in India-Pakistan ties since Modi visited Washington and the ongoing US draw-down from Afghanistan complicates this task. Like earlier Indian leaders, Modi sees no role for the US in India-Pakistan relations, least of all on Kashmir and he considers Washington insufficiently sensitive to Indian concerns in Afghanistan. Obama’s Republic Day visit was an opportunity to put the challenges posed by Pakistan and Afghanistan into the larger picture of India’s regional and global leadership, and to reflect together on how India and the US can pursue the interests they share. This should extend as well to the rest of South Asia, where India and the US should have an easier time developing common ground.
India-Pakistan relations have deteriorated dangerously since mid-2014, the result of both the Modi government’s policy and internal Pakistani politics. Frequent firing across the Line of Control and the international border between the two countries has largely erased a ceasefire that had held quite well for ten years. Modi’s abrupt decision on August 19, 2014 to cancel talks between the Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries played into this worsening situation. India’s move was a response to Pakistan’s decision to talk to Kashmiri separatists before the India-Pakistan meeting, as it had done before virtually every India-Pakistan negotiating session for years. Worst of all, in many ways, was the political confrontation that boiled over in Pakistan in mid-August. Serious India-Pakistan progress requires strong governments in both Delhi and Islamabad.
As China’s presence becomes more prominent, the India-US bond is likely to strengthen. In Bangladesh, the two countries took very different approaches to the troubled election a year ago. India, concerned primarily about the opposition party’s ties to Islamic fundamentalists, overtly supported Sheikh Hasina, who won a huge parliamentary majority in an election that her opponents boycotted. The US initially distanced itself from Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, but to her dismay; Washington has since backed away from its earlier call for new elections and requesting for resolving problems through dialogue with the opponents.
In Sri Lanka, Maithripala Sirisena’s stunning electoral victory offers a chance to both the countries to turn around relationships that have shifted in unproductive directions. The task may be easier for India, where alarm bells went off when Chinese submarines called in Colombo in November 2014. For the US, the big issue had been the strong US push for accountability for events at the end of Sri Lanka’s long civil war in 2009, which the defeated Rajapaksa government vehemently opposed.
From Washington’s perspective a successful Indian “reset” will be good for Indian Ocean region stability and may help the US improve at least the tone of its ties with Colombo as well. Still a question arises, what scope is there for cooperation?
The omission of Pakistan from the Modi-Obama joint statement was not an accident. Indian leaders have chafed for decades at the very idea of an outsider having a role in its most painful bilateral relationship. On another line up, India and the US share important interests in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but for the political health of countries near the Indian Ocean, including Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, both New Delhi and Washington find their strategic importance. Obama’s agenda finds many issues where he will advocate specific Indian actions, but on these regional problems, a less prescriptive approach is likely to be more productive.
This type of dialogue can start to change the dynamic of how the US and India address issues seemingly awkward from historical point of view. It may also lead towards more concrete cooperation to mesh better with India’s ambitions and capabilities.
Neither India, nor China would like to see the United States having a dominant role in South Asia, Indian Ocean including the Bay of Bengal and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. As a matter of fact, both India, the regional power, and China, world’s one of the biggest economic giants, would consider it better for the United States to play a lesser but cooperative role in South Asia. As a result, most South Asian nations will depend heavily on investments from major economic powers like China, Russia, Japan, the United States and the European Union. Considering the state of affairs in South Asia, what role does the United States want to play? Its South Asia policy does not indicate as of now that it wants to be any part of such developmental processes.
What the US policy towards South Asia presently centres around is how to contain China or to maintain a strong presence in the neighbourhood, which could prevent China from exercising its ‘hegemonic’ tendency. To serve its own interest at any cost, Washington, however, may pursue its foreign policy even to disturb the internal integrity of any South Asian country just like what has been done in many Muslim countries. Having friendship with the United States, Pakistan is already a failed state, Sri Lanka is to fall again into the US trap to distance itself from China and Bangladesh yet to see a good gesture from the world’s biggest power.
The other issue is Afghanistan, which is now a part of the SAARC. With the withdrawal of the bulk of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, the United States would like Afghanistan to remain close to Washington. It is evident that the United States’ South Asia policy will also be attentive to the SAARC nations’ actions vis-àvis Afghanistan. If any South Asian nation opposes the US policy towards Afghanistan, it is likely Washington will react adversely. At the same time, Washington will be trying to organize the South Asian nations to distance themselves as much as possible from both China and Russia, which is not possible.
That policy could lead to some security arrangements; but the South Asian nations must not expect any monetary benefit coming out of such association in the short or mid term. For instance, annual naval exercises like the Malabr exercise under the joint initiatives of India and the United States along with Japan is basically a coordination among the three navies to develop trilateral cooperation that is a necessary countermeasure against the growing naval power of China. It is likely that the United States will make efforts in the coming years to expand this exercise to incorporate some South East Asian nations, as well.
At a Senate Committee hearing, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Nisha Desai Biswal in last July said: ‘We will be doing joint exercises with Japan and India in the MALABAR exercises later this fall. And we see opportunities for increasing the collaboration across Southeast Asia. We are engaging more frequently in consultation and dialogue with the Indians on ASEAN, and look forward to increased and frequent consultation across the East Asia sphere.’ At the same hearing, Lisa Curtis of the Heritage Foundation said: ‘Indo-Japanese ties, in particular, are expected to get a major boost under Modi’s administration since Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe are both increasingly concerned about China and appear prepared to take new policy directions to deal with the challenges posed by Beijing’s rapid military and economic ascendance.’
While these statements cannot be construed as policy statements of Obama, precious little is coming out of Washington that could be identified as well-formulated future US policy towards South Asia. Notwithstanding the Malabar naval exercises, Washington must note that over the decades, India has steadfastly opposed any US military base in Sri Lanka, Maldives or Bangladesh. India’s position on that has not changed and will not change in the foreseeable future. In addition to many individual economic and military contracts and deals that would be trumpeted by media as examples of strengthening India-US ties, the US must note that Modi has already put his emphasis on economic diplomacy as its cornerstone. He will play his ball with every country, China, Russia, United States, Japan and even Pakistan.
The sharp deterioration in India-Pakistan ties since Modi visited Washington and the ongoing US draw-down from Afghanistan complicates this task. Like earlier Indian leaders, Modi sees no role for the US in India-Pakistan relations, least of all on Kashmir and he considers Washington insufficiently sensitive to Indian concerns in Afghanistan. Obama’s Republic Day visit was an opportunity to put the challenges posed by Pakistan and Afghanistan into the larger picture of India’s regional and global leadership, and to reflect together on how India and the US can pursue the interests they share. This should extend as well to the rest of South Asia, where India and the US should have an easier time developing common ground.
India-Pakistan relations have deteriorated dangerously since mid-2014, the result of both the Modi government’s policy and internal Pakistani politics. Frequent firing across the Line of Control and the international border between the two countries has largely erased a ceasefire that had held quite well for ten years. Modi’s abrupt decision on August 19, 2014 to cancel talks between the Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries played into this worsening situation. India’s move was a response to Pakistan’s decision to talk to Kashmiri separatists before the India-Pakistan meeting, as it had done before virtually every India-Pakistan negotiating session for years. Worst of all, in many ways, was the political confrontation that boiled over in Pakistan in mid-August. Serious India-Pakistan progress requires strong governments in both Delhi and Islamabad.
As China’s presence becomes more prominent, the India-US bond is likely to strengthen. In Bangladesh, the two countries took very different approaches to the troubled election a year ago. India, concerned primarily about the opposition party’s ties to Islamic fundamentalists, overtly supported Sheikh Hasina, who won a huge parliamentary majority in an election that her opponents boycotted. The US initially distanced itself from Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, but to her dismay; Washington has since backed away from its earlier call for new elections and requesting for resolving problems through dialogue with the opponents.
In Sri Lanka, Maithripala Sirisena’s stunning electoral victory offers a chance to both the countries to turn around relationships that have shifted in unproductive directions. The task may be easier for India, where alarm bells went off when Chinese submarines called in Colombo in November 2014. For the US, the big issue had been the strong US push for accountability for events at the end of Sri Lanka’s long civil war in 2009, which the defeated Rajapaksa government vehemently opposed.
From Washington’s perspective a successful Indian “reset” will be good for Indian Ocean region stability and may help the US improve at least the tone of its ties with Colombo as well. Still a question arises, what scope is there for cooperation?
The omission of Pakistan from the Modi-Obama joint statement was not an accident. Indian leaders have chafed for decades at the very idea of an outsider having a role in its most painful bilateral relationship. On another line up, India and the US share important interests in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but for the political health of countries near the Indian Ocean, including Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, both New Delhi and Washington find their strategic importance. Obama’s agenda finds many issues where he will advocate specific Indian actions, but on these regional problems, a less prescriptive approach is likely to be more productive.
This type of dialogue can start to change the dynamic of how the US and India address issues seemingly awkward from historical point of view. It may also lead towards more concrete cooperation to mesh better with India’s ambitions and capabilities.
