Dr Jamal Khan :
(From previous issue)
As for integration within a ministry, some interrelated aspects seem germane. The first concerns the crucial question whether the original raison d’être for the commission still obtains. Is there still a need for an independent and non-partisan organisation to preserve the integrity of the sector and protect its personnel from the danger of nepotism and favouritism in appointments, promotions, placement, etc? Some in the civil society and in the public sector tend to hold the view that suspicions about patronage appointments, cushy promotions and extensive cronyism, etc and the fear of victimisation are too strong for locating such functions within a ministry structure.
This assessment does not merely reflect a hangover of the attitude of distrust of politicians which found part of the rationale for the creation of the commission on the eve of the ministerial system. It is also an assessment which is driven by intensely-competitive political party culture where allegations of the ruling-party supporters benefitting and the opposition-party members being victimised abound. These fears have been intensified by the increasingly polarised conditions in the larger society and are compounded by its rudimentary and personalized nature.
A related constraint lies in the fact that a constitutional amendment may be required to effect an organisational status change of such a scale. In many countries, such an amendment or even a regulation change – given the composition and interest-specificity of parliament – such a move may not be considered feasible. Nor would any representative government in pluralistic environments be expected to press for such a status change since it recognises consensus, incrementalism, gradualism and mutual partisan adjustment on which the Westminster-Whitehall model is based.
Another version would entail altering the commission’s role and functions to that of a supervisory, standard-setting, appellate and review organisation. In this role, the executive/operational functions of appointment, promotion and discipline would be carried out in the first instance by the ministry personnel on the basis of job openings, standards, criteria, qualifications, experience, etc set by the commission in association with the ministry. These functions can be decentralised up to certain levels and delegated to line ministries/departments. The commission would monitor and review the exercise of these powers continually and would in its judicial capacity act as a court of appeal to hear appeals and complaints from individual employees or employee groups about allegations of unfair or discriminatory matters. Some questions arise in respect of the modified version: what advantages would flow from delegation by the commission to another agency; if there would not be strong opposition from public personnel, unions and general public even though the commission retains final authority and control; and such a change may still require a constitutional amendment – rather than a regulation change – since an extension of delegated authority and functions to line ministries/departments in a decentralised operation is involved.
Another option could take a form and modality in which the commission gets integrated into a public service ministry and the commissioners assume the position of senior civil servants in the ministry with answerability for relevant policy and practice. In respect of such policy matters, the commissioners are responsible through the ministry secretary to the minister. But they would also continue to deal with personnel functions relating to individual employees when the commissioners would put on a different hat as an independent organisation.
This option is not recommendable because it requires a level of understanding, sophistication, subtlety and role-playing not easily available in developing societies. Not only that. It may require a constitutional amendment.
Yet another choice involves integration at the level of personnel services, i.e. the commission would be merged with the public service ministry as a single agency. Greater rationalisation, streamlining and control over policymaking and policy implementation become attainable, especially in some critical and contentious areas, e.g. recruitment planning and procedures, performance evaluation, policy formulation and execution, personnel record provision and storage, human resource planning and employee training and development.
Aspects of these functions which are currently handled by the ministry would more effectively be brought together with those currently in the charge of the commission and placed in divisions or units under the chief personnel officer. This employee would relate to the minister through the ministry secretary on policy issues and general matters, while continuing to serve as the chief executive officer of the commission dealing with individual personnel matters. This course would result in personnel rationalisation and cost-saving. It is assumed that this modality could be effected without the need for a constitutional amendment, although legal advice should be sought.
Understandably, with the emergence of the public service ministry, the areas of overlapping of functions between the ministry and the commission would come to view. The areas of duplication can be eliminated or curbed by a merger or integration of personnel.
(To be continued)
(Dr Jamal Khan was professor of public sector management at the University of the West Indies. [email protected])
