IT is astonishing that after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the militant group Islamic State has, with stunning efficiency, in recent days overtaken Mosul, the second-largest city; occupied facilities in the strategic oil-refining town of Baiji; and are now headed for Baghdad. Hundreds of thousands of civilians have been forced to flee their homes and untold numbers have been killed.
As the events unfolded, it was almost unbelievable that thousands of the Maliki government’s Army troops had surrendered their weapons to ISIL and disappeared. After disbanding Saddam Hussein’s army in 2003 after the invasion by US led coalition forces and dismantling the government, the United States spent years and many billions of dollars building a new Iraqi Army, apparently for naught. The militants have captured indefinable quantities of American-supplied weaponry, including helicopters. They have overtaken a small airport and captured airplanes.
The deadly upsurge is the work of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, which grew out of Al Qaeda in Iraq and is more violent than its predecessor. Since the United States withdrew from Iraq at the end of 2011, the group has steadily gained strength and recruited thousands of foreign fighters; it broke with Al Qaeda earlier this year and is now viewed as a leader of global jihad.
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is said to be in a state of shocked panic. Mr. Maliki has been central to the political catastrophe that has destroyed Iraq, as he exercised dictatorial power in favour of the Shiite majority at the expense of the minority Sunnis, which exacerbated the sectarian conflict and enabled a climate in which militants could thrive. The growing violence in Iraq was apparent throughout 2013, when more than 8,000 Iraqis were killed, including nearly 1,000 Iraqi security forces; news reports say the militants planned a takeover for more than a year. So what was actually Mr. Maliki doing?
All these militant groups have born after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. There was no Al Qaeda or ISIL in Iraq when America was not there. The rushing through of the Constitution which is unworkable, the imposition of a political system, albeit with the best of intentions and goodwill did not work. Some parts of Iraq may apparently think that they are liberated, but what they are actually choosing are persecutors who will torture them less severely whether it’s the sectarian government militias or Al Qaeda, or ISIL. That’s the choice they have right now.
But what is the way out? There is a way that may not serve the West’s interests but is from within the indigenous Iraqi people: nor from the green zone in Baghdad or from the alien foreigners of ISIL. In 2007, the people of Al Anbar resisted and successfully annihilated Al Qaeda. But, as soon as the last militant of Al Qaeda was kicked out of Iraq the government militia took over and turned against the local residents who resisted against Al Qaeda and demanded they should submit to charges of terrorism for themselves. And it is part of the reason that even if the local residents have the capacity to overthrow the ISIL militia like they did in 2007, they are not sure to do so simply because they were backstabbed in 2007. The government of Maliki is relying too much on America. What he would have done is to make his government all inclusive making needed compromise between Shias and Sunnis.
