Can USA reach political target in Afghanistan?

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Choudhury Zafor Sadeque :
At last Tramp Administration declared new Afghan policy of accelerating war by adding four thousands new soldiers in addition to existing eight thousand four hundred. This declaration created mixed reaction world over. Amid the declaration of the Taliban insurgents to continue the war till last drop of blood, analysts forecast after this declaration the number of deaths of US soldiers will increase only without any end.
US and ISAF policy in Afghanistan is in doldrums. With the drawdown of the US ground combat elements in Afghanistan, the onus of preventing the Taliban overrunning the Afghan National government has now squarely shifted to the Afghan National Army, which the US has spent a fortune to raise, arm and train. The latest deadly Taliban attack at a northern army base in Afghanistan that killed over 140 Afghan soldiers and civilians has exposed what many experts both in USA and abroad had repeatedly warned nepotism, corruption and desertion has rendered the Afghan National Army unfit to ward off a resurgent Taliban offensive. Reports emanating from within indicate the Taliban attackers had help from the inside, by Taliban sympathizers who had been recruited as soldiers in the Afghan National Army and were deployed at the base under attack.
In a Vietnam War ending in Afghanistan on the card ? The Taliban already exercise de facto control over 40% of Afghanistan and chances are post ISAF exit, the country would degenerate into the kind of civil war witnessed from 1990 to 1995. Afghanistan has already gained the dubious reputation as the longest combat operations undertaken by the US forces in history, with no end in sight. Rather than accepting policy and strategy failures that have resulted in the present quagmire, the US military commandres and administration prefer to shift the blame on neighbouring Pakistan. The validity of their accusations and charges need close scrutiny.
Pakistan is the only country that had sacrificed more then 70,000 people in being US ally in war against terrorism. Moreover Pakistan suffered the loss of hundred billion dollars during last 16 years in the war, more than 5 Lac Pakistani people are IDP(internally displaced person) within own country. In this backdrop President Trump’s recant speech is an attempt to blame Pakistan of failure in Afghanistan is just like finding scapegoat for their own failure. President Trump also hinted about more role of India in Afghanistan which is a perfect recipe for creating destabilisation in this reghion
Operation Enduring Freedom was launched in December 2001, to punish the Taliban government in Afghanistan for giving shelter to Osama bin Laden, considered the mastermind of the 9/11 attack. Pakistan was made a reluctant ally based on the threat of “either you are with us or against us” and the implied warning of being “bombed to the stone-age.” The military operation succeeded in dislodging the Taliban but by allowing their fighters to survive due to faulty strategy, failed to complete the operational cycle.
The US airpower paralysed the Taliban forces that allowed the pro US Northern Alliance conglomerate to advance and claim victory. Barring a handful of Us Special Forces no US ground combat element participated in the campaign. The Taliban leading commanders and their foot soldiers managed to slip away into neighbouring Pakistan’s tribal region of South Waziristan relatively unscathed. Even Osama bin Laden, the principal target of the operations evaded capture and escaped when he was trapped in the Tora Bora Valley, because of paucity of US ground troops in the area. The US commanders failed to appreciate the lack of professionalism of the Nothern Alliance military and their susceptibility and penchant to bribery. Reports of the Taliban fighters given safe passage after payment of money have beeb confirmed by independent sources.
The Taliban diaspora in South Waziristan managed to recoup and prepare for a counter offensive. The 2003 US pivot when it shifted focus on military operation fron Afghanistan to lraq provided the Taliban the opportunity they were seeking. Pakistan came under intense US pressure to destroy the Taliban sanctuaries in South Waziristan. Operation Al Mizan was launched by the Pakistan Army to expel the Taliban from South Waziristan. Employment of a conventional war fighting strategy against an adversary waging an asymmetric war was doomed to fail. Al Mizan failed to achieve its military objective and Pakistan signed a truce with the adversary that angered the Americans who accused Pakistan of a sell out .
The Haqqani network in North Waziristan was and still remain the principal bone of contention between USA and Pakistan. The former accuses the latter of being in league with the Haqqunis considered the prime threat to ISAF and Afghan government. Pakistan on the other hand has alwaya danied the charge and tried to explain that it just did not have the necessary wherewithal to simultaneously start major military offensive in Swat, South Waziristan and North Waziristan where the Taliban and the TTP had established their stronghold. It had to prioritize and tackle them one by one, starting with the Swat Valley. Going after the Haqqanis was delayed until 2013 because of some genuine concerns and some perceptions that (with hindsight) should have been ignored. A time line on how Pakistan tackled the Taleban insurgency in its tribal belts would better explain Pakistan’s position in handling the Haqqani crisis. Without revamping the military doctrine and strategy, operations against the Taleban would have been counter productive. As it was, the Al Mizan campaign has cost Pakistan dearly in the shape of the rise of the TTP whose sole objective is to wage a war against Pakistan. It took nearly 4 years for Pakistan Army to get its Act together and develop a fresh sub conventional war fighting dectrine. This was initially tested in the 2007 military operation in Swat where partial success was achieved. Fazlullah, the rebel leader, escaped but his private army continued to harass the federal forces deployed. The militants operating under Fazlullah signed a 16 point peace treaty with the then NWFP(renamed khyber Pakhtunkhoa) government in May 2008 and agreed to disband the militia . Fazlullah’s reign of terror, however, did not abate and eventually the federal government scrapped the treaty and ordered the military to launch a fresh campaign to dislodge the insurgents.
Operation Rah e Rast was initiated in April 2009 and Fazlullah and his band were routed. Fazlullah managed to survive and has since taken refuge in the eastern province of Afghanistan from where he continues to launch subversive raids against Pakistan.
South Waziristan was next on the list. Another military assauit codenamed Rah e Nijat in October 2009 destroyed the TTP and Taliban infrastructure, bringing the unruly tribal agency under control. North Waziristan was the final phase of the campaign against the Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan. Compared to Swat and South Waziristan, North Waziristan was the most formidable challenge, given the very rugged topography that favoured the insurgents whose rank and file had swelled by the TTP remnants who had survived the South Waziristan offensive. General Ashfaq Kayani, the Army Chief until 2013 was reluctant to take on North Waziristan until Swat and South Waziristan gains were consolidated. The attack on the Army Public School in December 2013 convinced kayani’s successor General Raheel Sharif that North Waziristan operations could no longer be delayed.
 Operation Zarb e Azb began in 2014 and Haqqani network including other Taliban factions were uprooted. Despite Pakistan’s plea the Afgan government and ISAF did not take necessary measures to create an anvil on their side to crush the retreating Haqqani forces making a beeline towards the eastern provinces of Afganistan. The Haqqanis and TTP are now firmly ensconced in Afghanistan and are freely carrying out murderous raids both against Pakistan and Afghanistan . The Afgan goverrnment ISAF admit to the presence pf these factions in their land but plead inability to expel them. Pakistan rightfully complains about the inability or unwillingness of Afghanistan and ISAF from preventing use of their territory from cross border terror raids inside Pakistan.  
Are remmants of Haqqani group and other local and foreign terrorists still present in North Waziristan ? Yes, some have taken refuge in the villages and the countryside not only in North Waziristan but in other tribal belts that had been cleared of the insurgents. Their sleeper cells which had been prepositioned in the urban centres of Pakistan have been activated . The current spate of suicide attacks in all the four provinces of Pakistan is the result. The nation’s military and intelligence agencies are engaged in the final urban warfare phase of the campaign, a phase that is messy, expensive and time consuming. Intelligence based air and lands strike are a continuous process and are being carried out periodically against this group.
16 years of continues US military action in Afghanistan and an investment of over trillion dollars in the process has failed to subdue the Taliban’s and stabilize Afghanistan. And yet USA continues to blame Pakistan for not doing enough against the terror elements operating in and from Pakistan. They even fail to appreciate that Pakistan with far lesser resources has achieved major military success in destroying the Taliban infrastructure at a horrendous cost of life and limb . To continue to accuse Pakistan of not doing enough is so wrong and unfair. To better comprehend whether the litany of charges by USA about Pakistan being the primary factor fort the US failure in Afghanistan are true or false, a critical examination of the US policy in Afghanistan would be in order.
 US invasion of Afghanistan became unavoidable after the Taliban government refused to hand over OBL, the alleged mastermind and financier of the twin tower attack. If Bush(Junior) had followed in the footstep of the father, Bush(senior) kept the political objective of Operation Enduring freedom limited to ousting of the Taliban regime rather than reshaping the Afgan police to reflect the western democratic value, current disaster could have been averted.  
The Taliban might have regained power if the US had withdrawn after toppling the Taliban regime by November 2001; it would have much chastened and infinitely less disastrous than the current catastrophe and over trillion US dollars spent to date in Afghanistan, the loss of about 4000 US troops and civilian contractors and the gradual erosion of the US hard and soft power would have been averted.
 (To be continued)
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