Ibne Siraj :
What was hitherto impossible became possible on November 20 this year with signing of a military cooperation agreement between Pakistan and Russia. Russian Defense Minister General Sergey Shoigu visited Islamabad along with other Russian officials and signed an unprecedented Russian-Pakistan defense cooperation agreement. While in Islamabad, Shoigu was also engaged in wide-ranging talks with his Pakistani counterpart, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, on Afghanistan, regional security, arms sales and other issues. In so doing, Shoigu became the first Russian defense minister to visit Pakistan since 1969, when the Soviet government made an unsuccessful effort to mediate tensions between Pakistan and India. Since then, relations between Moscow and Islamabad have been atrocious, partly due to the close and enduring defense ties between Moscow and New Delhi. The Russian move has come just about three weeks before Russian President Vladimir Putin visits India for an annual summit between India and Russia, an exercise going on since 2000.
Relations deteriorated in particular during the early 1980s, when Pakistan served as the West’s frontline ally against the Soviet Union on the Afghan issue. Russian policymakers in the past routinely described Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism, also as a failed state where extremists adversely influence the government policy, threaten to subvert other countries and risk gaining control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons for possible use against Russia. However, the new Pakistan-Russian tie may go down as one of the worst strategic and diplomatic failures of India in recent times. Russia has stepped up its rapprochement with India’s arch-rival Pakistan just as India is getting closer to the United States. What was almost unthinkable took place quite perceptively as India’s proven and trusted friend, ally and strategic partner signed a never-before defence cooperation pact with Pakistan. This defence script is to create a new history since Moscow has agreed to cooperate with Pakistan in combating terrorism and offered advanced counter-terrorism training to Islamabad.
This unexpected move between Russia and Pakistan marks a stunning change in the rapidly changing and evolving international statecraft. It lives up to the old adage: There are no permanent friends or permanent enemies in politics; there are only permanent interests. Months ago, Moscow lifted its embargo on arms supplies to Pakistan and began negotiations with Islamabad for sale of combat helicopters. Russia has been somewhat cool with India for several years, started in 2012 when Moscow lost contract for several big-ticket Indian defence deals and the situation exacerbated in 2013. By 2014, the United States had usurped the number one position as India’s top arms exporter-a position that the Russians had traditionally enjoyed for decades. Russia had to open out to Pakistan in view of the upcoming thinning of US and NATO troops in Afghanistan. A lawless Afghanistan falling back into the clutches of Taliban is as hair-raising a nightmare for the Russian security managers as it is for the Indians. Pakistan is a crucial and unique stakeholder for Russia in this context.
Something positive about the recent Pak-Russia defence pact could be presumed in late 2012, when Pakistan’s former army chief General Ashfaq Kayani visited Russia. Prominent Indian analysts oversimplified Kayani’s that visit, as there was a thaw in the bilateral relations between Pakistan and Russia after the breakthrough made by former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf’s visit to Russia in 2003. Mosharraf’s visit has signified much more than is being understood. From India’s perspective, Kayani’s visit was not about post-2014 Afghanistan alone. It was also not about the so-called special overall relationship between India and Russia. It was basically about India’s deep defence relations with Russia. Growing ties between Pakistan and Russia have the potential to harm India in this field. It needs to be noted that Moscow is keen to befriend Pakistan’s army rather than its civilian government. Notwithstanding numerous negative indicators, India has allowed its defence relations with Russia to grow at a breathtaking pace.
For at least a decade from now, the ongoing Afghan conflict and cross-border issues like terrorism, organized crime, and nuclear security, all reverberating in Moscow, guarantee long-term engagement between Russia and Pakistan. To address these shared challenges, Moscow needs a new door to South Asia that prioritizes Russian-Pakistani ties. Russia has articulated its national objectives in specific South Asian countries, like fighting drug trafficking in Afghanistan, capitalizing on India’s economic growth, and working with Pakistan, but it lacks a cohesive South Asia strategy. Regional instability and Pakistan’s weak political regime mean the country may face serious security threats in the coming years.
Pakistani and Russian security interests are increasingly intertwined, so Moscow cannot afford to ignore the emergence of new threats in Islamabad. Developing relations would benefit both the countries, but there are obstacles to closer cooperation. Moscow does not want to provoke India, Pakistan’s regional rival; a history of conflict has damaged Russian-Pakistani trust; and security concerns make Russian companies reluctant to do business in Pakistan.
Constructive dialogue is taking place on potential Russian-Pakistani civil nuclear cooperation. Although such collaboration is unlikely, these talks allow the two countries to address shared concerns. Steps Russia can take to improve relations by developing an integrated Russian policy on South Asia. Instead of pursuing different interests in each country, Moscow should formulate a coherent, over arching regional strategy to better address threats from South Asia.
In recent years, Russia has begun to take a more pronounced political interest in Pakistan than ever before. To counter the shared threats, the two countries must overcome existing difficulties-including their long and conflict-ridden history and potential objections from neighboring countries-and forge a new Russian-Pakistani relationship. Historically, Moscow’s interest in Pakistan seems to have been primarily academic. Despite the geographic distance, Soviet researchers began analyzing what would become Pakistan over half a century ago-the first Soviet work on Pakistan appeared in 1943, before the state was actually created.
Several years ago, the view that Pakistan belongs to the US and the Chinese spheres of influence was quite common in Russia. Many in Moscow believed that even serious threats to Pakistan’s security would affect Islamabad’s close partners and neighbors but would not impact Russia. Moscow seemed largely uninterested in developing its relations with Pakistan, especially as these ties did not promise to yield quick and large dividends for Russian state corporations. It also feared that moving closer to Islamabad could harm Russia’s more lucrative relations with India, whose tie with Pakistan has long been fraught. Today, Russia’s views on Pakistan seem to have shifted. Despite the absence of a common border, Russia and Pakistan face a number of similar problems, from terrorism to organized crime to nuclear security. Moscow also has interests in South Asia that have forced it to develop its ties with Islamabad and other regional actors in recent years. And while Russia approaches Pakistan as part of its larger strategy in South Asia, Moscow and Islamabad have their own agenda not dependent on other countries. Further improving the ties between these two nations can be an important instrument of economic growth and security in both South and Central Asia.
On other arguments, none in the government has explained what is meant by traditional ties. To put matters in cold perspective, once President Putin had settled down in his first term in office after the abysmal Yeltsin years, he has played a hard ball. It appears that traditional comfort is more in New Delhi than in Moscow. Now, about Kayani’s visit to Russia, it is assumed that the growing ties between Pakistan and Russia are about Afghanistan alone. So, the two side will work more on counter-terrorism; intelligence sharing, equipment sales, sharing of doctrines, and finally joint exercises. Considering that the Pakistan Army has an exceptional expertise in using terrorists in a conventional war, its ISI would slowly but surely come to know the level of all type (including restrictive) of military cooperation between India and Russia. This will provide a decisive edge to the Pakistan Army, which openly speaks of India as existential military threat. With India’s high reliance level in military acquisitions from Russia, and given its poor indigenous defence industry, the future does not portend well for Indian defence services.
