Ibne Siraj :
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to India drew a global attention. It is considered as an important footstep in the diplomacy between Beijing and all South Asian countries. The way China is steadily extending its reach into South Asia with its growing economic and strategic influence, the West must be shaken seeing such a rise in the diplomacy between China and this region. Except for India, China runs trade surpluses with all other partners including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan. But China makes up for these trade deficits with massive investment in infrastructure development, socio-economic needs, and, above all, energy production of its trade partners. Fast on the heels of the US offer of nuclear power plants to India, China has offered Pakistan and Bangladesh nuclear power plants of its own to meet their energy needs. Beijing also showers these nations with low-cost financial capital to help their rising development sector. The largest beneficiaries of this economic aid are Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal – in that order.
In keeping with its economic expansion, China has deepened its strategic influence in the region, especially with India’s immediate neighbors-Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Beijing has also long been maintaining a close strategic link with Islamabad, but its overtures to the remaining countries were hobbled by the 1962 Sino-Indian war and its protracted pariah status as “communist,” endured until the early 1970s. China’s entry into South Asia gained momentum only after its conversion to the market economy in the 1980s, which filled its coffers with trade and investment dollars. Afterwards, its resultant economic strength opened the path into South Asia, beyond Pakistan. China skillfully deployed economic incentives to draw Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka into its strategic orbit. Today China and India are more politically and economically engaged than at any time in recent history. The bilateral trade expanded by 67 folds from 1998 to 2012, and the Chinese and Indian armies held their first-ever joint military exercise in 2007, followed by two more in 2008 and 2013.
Both China and India have periodically found common agenda on global issues of mutual interest like world trade talks, climate-change negotiations, primacy of state sovereignty, and the need to reform global-governance institutions. Most important, both capitals have shown a commitment to mitigate recurring tensions in their relationship. When crises do arise, they respond calmly and patiently to dissolve any crisis diplomatically. However, cooperation and competition coexist in this relation, advancing in tandem on parallel tracks. And while the cooperative track has been accelerating since the turn of the century, the strategic competition has kept pace, and in some arenas advanced faster. The phenomenon should be familiar to Washington as the US-Chinese relations operate in a similar framework: deeper integration in diplomatic and economic spheres accompanied by growing strategic mistrust in the security arena. Perhaps, the key feature of the China-India rivalry is that while it is felt and sustained by both parties, it is in many ways one-sided.
China-India relations have been on a new upward track in recent years with developing a model link characterized by expanding bilateral cooperation while properly handling differences. This model has become an example of relations among countries under new international situation. Xi’s visit has hinted that China is ready to join hands with India to deepen strategic trust, properly handle differences, promote cooperation in various fields and strengthen communication and coordination on global and regional issues. Since the China-India relation is a prior agenda in China’s foreign policy, Xi says there is a historic mission to push forward this tie between the two countries. This is the first time that a Chinese leader has made such remarks. Therefore, on the bilateral front, the two countries will have high-level exchange by strengthening strategic and political communication and enhancing mutual understanding through political dialogue and consultation at various stages. They would also expand defense exchange and cooperation to jointly maintain peace in border areas.
On the other hand, the South Asian countries have been given a prominent role in several Russian doctrines and strategies. The 2008 Russian Foreign Policy Concept, which outlines Moscow’s foreign policy goals and objectives, dwells at some length on India and other countries in the region. It sets out several objectives with regard to India on bilateral, trilateral and multilateral levels: 1. Russia pursues a closer strategic partnership with India and aims to strengthen cooperation on pressing international issues; 2. Its goal is to foster mutually beneficial bilateral ties in all areas with a focus on trade and economic cooperation. 3. Russia shares China’s and India’s interest in establishing effective foreign-policy and economic cooperation in the trilateral Russia-India-China format. Since Russia “regards improving the quality of international governance and creating a self-regulating international system as an important priority”, it intends to “step up cooperation in such formats as the G8, The Big Three (Russia, India, China) and BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China)”.
Russia’s strategies in South Asia and the nearby regions are also outlined in the Russian Naval Doctrine Up To 2020 and the Russian National Security Strategy Up To 2020. The 2001 Naval Doctrine states the following long-term Russian goals in the Indian Ocean: 1. Strengthening the Russian shipping and fishing industries, and undertaking joint efforts with other countries to protect shipping from piracy. 2. Pursuing a deliberate strategy of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, stability and good-neighborly relations; ensuring periodic Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The Russian strategy in South Asia is further fleshed out in President Vladimir Putin’s keynote article “Russia and the Changing World”. The article says that Russia is an “inalienable and integral part of Greater Europe” aiming to capitalize on economic growth in the Asia Pacific region, especially in China and India. It dwells at some length on China but devotes only two sentences to India, saying that the country is Russia’s privileged strategic partner, and that Russian-Indian tie has a major impact on the formation of a polycentric world.
On the whole, the following conclusions can be made about South Asia’s role in Russian foreign-policy strategy: Russia is very much sincere to develop closer bilateral ties with South Asia, and plays a more prominent role in the global political forums. South Asia is seen as a region where integration processes are very important for Russia and the Russian economy (with a recognition that India is the main engine of economic growth in the region). India is Russia’s privileged strategic partner, Afghanistan a close neighbor, Pakistan a leading regional power, roughly on a par with Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Iran or Saudi Arabia as far as Russian foreign policy is concerned. As preparations to counter regional security threats by military instruments are being made, Russia intends to achieve an adequate presence for its armed forces in the southern theater, a part of the remit of new South Operational-Strategic Command, established in 2010. The Russian naval force intends to establish a lasting presence in the Indian Ocean, probably by using ships and submarines of the Black Sea Fleet, which became a part of the South Operational-Strategic Command in 2010.
As political relations between Russia and India remain constructive, there is a climate of trust and a spirit of equal partnership. But trade relations including arms business and defense industry cooperation are facing problems creating an impression of crisis in their ties. To resolve these problems, prevent them from reappearing in the future and preserve the climate of trust and goodwill, following recommendations should be taken into account: 1. The Russian government should always keep a close eye on its policies in South Asia. It should carefully select candidates for missions to South Asian countries; 2. Russian representatives should not depend on the interests of individual companies, and they must have a direct line to the top Russian leadership. 3. Russia should transit from ad-hoc policies to a comprehensive and overarching strategy in South Asia; that strategy should be clearly communicated to all the government agencies, companies and other interested parties. 4. Russia should inform the South Asian audience about its positions, plans and approaches in a timely manner. There should be ongoing informal or semi-formal dialogue between experts and politicians in Russia and South Asian countries.
(Ibne Siraj is a regular contributor to The New Nation)
